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Why Do Sales People Spend So Much Time Lobbying for Low Prices? 
In business-to-business settings a company’s sales force often spends considerable time lobbying 
internally for authorization to charge lower prices.  These internal lobbying activities are time 
consuming, and divert attention from other tasks, such as interacting with customers. We explain why 
the sales force’s internal lobbying activities serve an important role. They help the firm elicit truthful 
reporting of demand information from the sales force.  As a result, it may be profitable for the firm to 
require lobbying (and make the requirement onerous), even though lobbying is a nonproductive activity 
that creates an additional administrative burden and imposes a deadweight loss.   
Key words: lobbying, influence activities, sales force management, pricing, agency theory, incentives, 
information elicitation, marketing-sales interface. 
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§ 1. Introduction 
“I have gradually begun to appreciate that many account managers perceive that 
it is easier to deal with the customer, compared to the difficulties of negotiating 
with their own managers and colleagues to get things done on the customer’s 
behalf.  Many would argue that internal negotiation is the real crux of the job.” 
Beth Rogers (2011 at page 82) 
Studies of pricing practices in business-to-business settings often refer to the inefficiencies that 
result from the sales force lobbying internally for lower prices.  Crainer and Dearlove (2004 at 
page 438) report that “more than 80 percent of all cases were ‘exceptions’ that required 
internal negotiation between marketing and sales. These constant price negotiations wasted 
considerable time.”  Similar examples can be found in Sodhi and Sodhi (2007) and Dietmeyer 
(2004). Notably, instead of banishing lobbying to reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies, many firms 
appear to make the process intentionally onerous.  We provide an explanation for why firms 
choose not to banish lobbying and why these apparently nonproductive activities may 
represent an equilibrium outcome. 
The explanation recognizes that the sales force often has private information about the 
strength of demand.  However, if the firm lowers prices when the sales force reports demand is 
low this may create an incentive for the sales force to understate demand, as it takes less effort 
to convince customers to buy when prices are low.  As a result, the firm must pay the sales 
force information rents to admit when demand is high.  Lobbying is a mechanism that the firm 
can use to help mitigate these rents.  It allows the firm to leverage the private information of 
the sales force in the low demand condition to reduce the information rents it pays when 
demand is high. 
We model the requirement to lobby for low prices as a requirement to present evidence that 
demand is low.  If it is easier for the sales force to produce this evidence when demand truly is 
low, then making this evidence a condition of approving a discount may be profitable for the 
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firm.  This is true even if the effort incurred to produce this evidence represent a deadweight 
loss.   
We motivate our investigation using examples acquired through a series of interviews with 
product managers and sales managers.1
In almost every interview managers acknowledged that their sales force is in a better position 
to evaluate customers’ willingness-to-pay.  However, they also recognized the need to manage 
the sales force’s lobbying activity.  Many firms report that they do compensate their sales force 
at least partially on the basis of prices.  It is also common for firms to shift the power to make 
pricing decisions away from the sales force, and pass it to a committee or manager who must 
approve any discount.  Most firms allow “price exceptions,” in which the sales force can lobby 
for price discounts.  However, the firm imposes requirements on the sales force when using this 
exception process.  We will illustrate why simply paying the sales force based on prices (or 
delegating the pricing decision to the sales force) may not fully resolve the incentive problem, 
and how imposing evidentiary requirements can contribute to higher profits.   
  The examples illustrate the different ways that sales 
people engage in lobbying for low prices, and the mechanisms that firms use to manage this 
process.  We heard many examples of sales people spending as much time negotiating 
internally as they spend interacting with external customers.  Much of this time is spent 
collecting evidence to justify requests to lower prices.  This includes collecting information 
about competitors’ prices, or reviewing historical sales data to highlight examples in which 
lower prices led to additional sales.  
Related Literature 
Previous studies have recognized the tension between the sales force and marketing.  For 
example, Kotler, Rackham and Krishnaswamy (2006) vividly describe the phenomenon:  “In 
                                                          
1 As additional background research for this study we investigated the prevalence of the lobbying phenomenon by 
surveying managers attending executive education classes.  In particular, we asked whether there was often 
concern at their firms that “sales people want to charge prices that are too low.”  Almost three quarters of the 
respondents agreed with this statement.  A more detailed description of these results is provided in the Appendix. 
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many companies, sales forces and marketers feud like Capulets and Montagues.  Salespeople 
accuse marketers of being out of touch with what customers really want or setting prices too 
high.  Marketers insist that salespeople focus too myopically on individual customers and short-
term sales at the expense of longer-term profits.”  A similar observation prompts Ernst, Hoyer, 
and Rübsaamen (2010) to call for better cross-functional cooperation among sales, marketing, 
and R&D in product development.   
Homburg and Jensen (2007 at page 124) also recognize that the tendency for sales people to 
ask for lower prices leads to conflict between the sales force and marketing: “Pioneering 
qualitative work on the interface between marketing and sales has pointed out that it is highly 
conflict laden in managerial practice.”  They cite Dewsnap and Jobber (2000 at page 109): “The 
marketing-sales relationship, whilst strongly interdependent, is reported as neither 
collaborative nor harmonious.”  Similarly, Montgomery and Webster (1997 at page 16) report 
from a Marketing Science Institute conference that: “Intrafunctional conflict within marketing 
was a more important topic ... than we had expected. The most frequently discussed issue was 
the conflict between sales and marketing.” Two international surveys of senior executives from 
different business-to-business industries have identified the tension between sales and 
marketing as one of the most important organizational challenges facing firms, and that 
reducing this tension would do the most to improve sales performance (Miller and Gist 2003, 
Rouziès 2004, cited in Rouziès et al. 2005).   
The sales force management literature in the business press frequently cautions that 
salespeople will tend to ask for lower prices in order to make their tasks easier.  For example, 
Marrs and Kennedy (2012) write: “Sales people often offer discounts before they should – or 
when they shouldn’t at all. They don’t get the price that a customer is willing to pay because, in 
their minds, low price is the only tool they have to close the sale.” Similarly, Schweiger, 
Sandberg, and Ragan (1986) write that faced with price pressure from customers, “sales may be 
tempted to myopic price cuts (and, thus, revenue and profit sacrifices) if marketing did not act 
as the devil’s advocate.”   
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More generally, our paper contributes to the large academic literature on sales force 
management.  Previous studies have investigated various facets of this problem, including the 
design of sales force compensation (Basu et al. 1985; Lal and Staelin 1986; Rao 1990; Coughlan 
and Narasimhan 1992; Raju and Srinivasan 1996), the role of sales assistance in product 
evaluations (Wernerfelt 1994; Kalra, Shi, and Srinivasan 2003), firms’ choice between 
surveillance and wages (Anderson 1985), firms’ assignment of different selling skills to different 
products (Godes 2003), and the design of sales contests (Kalra and Shi 2001; Lim, Ahearne, and 
Ham 2009; Lim 2010).2
A body of research investigates whether firms should delegate pricing authority to the sales 
force.  Weinberg (1975) shows that when sales outcomes are deterministic a firm can delegate 
pricing and ensure efficient prices using margin-based wages.  Lal (1986) finds that delegation 
can improve profits if the sales force has better information about the selling environment.  
Revisiting this conclusion, Joseph (2001) shows that delegation is inefficient if salespeople rely 
on price discounts to grow sales rather than exert effort to pursue high-valuation customers.  
Mishra and Prasad (2004) further demonstrate that centralized pricing is profit-maximizing if 
contracting occurs after the salesperson receives his private information.  Extending the 
investigation to competitive settings, Bhardwaj (2001) finds that delegation can soften price 
competition, and Mishra and Prasad (2005) prove that there always exists an equilibrium in 
which all firms choose centralized pricing.  In a recent working paper, Lim and Ham (2012) find 
that delegation benefits the firm because of positive reciprocity of the salespeople.  
   
We contribute to the sales force management literature by explicitly studying lobbying – a 
widely observed yet under-investigated phenomenon.  Our benchmark contract takes 
advantage of the sales force’s private information about demand by delegating the pricing 
decision to the sales force.  To ensure that the sales force charges the correct price the firm 
must pay an information rent to the sales force in high demand states.  We identify conditions 
                                                          
2 See Mantrala et al. (2010) for a recent survey of the literature on sales force modeling, and Misra and Nair (2011) 
for a structural model of sales force compensation dynamics.   
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under which the firm can reduce this information rent by requiring that the sales force lobby 
for discounts, even when the costs associated with lobbying represent a deadweight loss. 
The paper is also closely related to the economics literature on “influence activities.”  In many 
organizations significant effort is exerted on influencing organizational decisions, such as capital 
allocation among competing projects.  The literature has largely focused on the inefficiencies 
caused by influence activities (Milgrom 1988; Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts 1992; Scharfstein 
and Stein 2000; Wulf 2009).  One exception is Laux (2008), who argues that influence activities 
can benefit the firm’s capital budgeting process because a project manager’s choice to lobby 
reveals to the firm which projects are worth defending.  Similar to Laux (2008), we find that the 
seemingly wasteful activity of lobbying can help firms improve profits.  The main difference is 
that in Laux (2008), the screening effect of lobbying comes from the different returns it brings 
to different projects – better projects offer higher values to justify the same cost of lobbying.  In 
our paper, the screening effect comes from the different costs of lobbying in different demand 
conditions – it is harder to provide convincing evidence and lobby effectively when demand is 
high, even if the returns to lobbying are the same across demand conditions.  
The paper proceeds in Section 2 with examples that help to illustrate the context and motivate 
the modeling assumptions.  We then introduce the model setup and in preliminary analysis 
illustrate how price delegation requires that the firm pay information rents to induce the sales 
force to charge high prices.  In Section 3 we show that the lobbying mechanism can improve 
expected profit beyond price delegation by reducing these information rents.  In particular, we 
show that the firm can achieve this goal by requiring the sales rep to provide evidence of low 
demand to justify his request for a discount.  In Section 4 we consider several extensions to the 
model, including the possibilities that lobbying activities divert attention from selling activities, 
that the sales rep is risk averse, or that the firm can collect evidence on its own.  In Section 5 we 
extend the findings to a more general model with a continuous distribution of demand states 
and minimum functional-form assumptions.  The paper concludes in Section 6. 
6 | P a g e  
 
§ 2. Motivating Examples, Model Setup and Preliminary Analysis 
To motivate our model, we begin with two examples that arose during background interviews 
for this research.   
A US military contractor sells through a closed bid system with one primary competitor.  The 
sales people commonly spend more time negotiating internal price reductions than they do 
interacting with the customers.  For large discounts the price has to enter an exception process.  
Obtaining an exception depends upon the sales force presenting sufficient “evidence” to justify 
the discount.  In addition to informal information about the competitor’s prices, the sales force 
develops forecasts using past examples to substantiate claims that lower prices will lead to 
more transactions with the client.  The exception process is intentionally difficult to navigate.  
This is meant to ensure that “sales people only ask for lower prices when they need it to close 
the deal, rather than just when it would be easier to close the deal.”   
Our second example is from the telecommunications industry, where the success of Apple’s 
iPhone had convinced this firm’s product managers that it was possible to design a product that 
would “shift the demand curve.”  In contrast, the sales force was skeptical that any of the firm’s 
products would shift the demand curve, and focused instead on “where to locate on the 
demand curve.”  The sales force spent approximately 75% of their time lobbying internally for 
lower prices.  To support their lobbying they present data on competitors’ prices, and use 
historical sales data to illustrate the relationship between sales and price (the demand curve). 
These examples share several common features that form the basis of our analytical model.  
First, the sales force has better information about demand.  Second, lowering prices makes it 
easier for the sales force to close transactions.  The resulting potential for moral hazard leads to 
an atmosphere of distrust when the sales force requests a discount.  Third, the sales force can 
exert effort to lobby internally, and in equilibrium many sales people spend considerable time 
on this activity.  Finally, the firm can influence these lobbying activities by changing the sales 
force wages and requiring evidence before approving discounts.   
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Model Setup 
We consider a firm that hires a sales rep to sell its product to a customer.  The sales rep 
chooses whether to invest in selling effort.  The customer’s willingness-to-pay depends on this 
selling effort and the customer’s intrinsic strength of demand, which is high with probability 
𝑢 ∈ (0, 1) and low with probability 1 − 𝑢.  If demand is high, the customer’s willingness-to-pay 
is 𝑣𝐻 if the sales rep incurs selling effort and is 𝑣𝐿 otherwise.  If demand is low, the customer’s 
willingness-to-pay is 𝑣𝐿 if the sales rep incurs selling effort and is 0 otherwise.  We assume that 
𝑣𝐻 > 𝑣𝐿 > 0, such that both high demand and diligent selling contribute to higher willingness-
to-pay. 
Selling effort is costly to the sales rep.  Let the cost of selling effort be 𝑒𝐻 > 0 when demand is 
high and 𝑒𝐿 > 0 when demand is low.  We allow 𝑒𝐻 and 𝑒𝐿 to be different from each other 
without imposing a rank order between them (they may also be equal).  The firm does not 
observe the sales rep’s selling effort.  Neither does the firm observe the demand state because 
the sales rep has more localized information about the customer (see also Lal 1986).   
We consider a game with the following sequence of moves. 
1. The firm and the sales rep share a common prior belief that demand is high with 
probability 𝑢. 
2. The firm offers a compensation contract.  Specifically, the firm determines the sales 
commission conditional on price.  If the sales rep rejects the contract based on the 
comparison between his expected payoff from the contract and his outside option, the 
game ends.  If the sales rep accepts the offer, the game proceeds.  
3. The sales rep privately observes the realized demand state. 
4. The sales rep reports to the firm whether demand is high or low. 
5. The firm determines the price to be charged to the customer. 
6. The sales rep chooses selling effort. 
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7. The customer decides whether to buy and this decision is commonly observed.  The firm 
receives its profit and the sales rep receives his compensation. 
We will compare two mechanisms: price delegation and lobbying.  If the firm implements price 
delegation, in step 5 above it will simply choose the price following the sales rep’s demand 
report in step 4.  Although the firm directly sets the price, the price is effectively chosen by the 
sales rep.  If the firm implements lobbying, the sales rep must provide evidence to justify his 
demand report in step 4, and the firm in step 5 will follow the sales rep’s report only if he has 
met the evidentiary requirement.  We will provide further details of the lobbying mechanism 
after presenting a set of preliminary analysis. 
We assume that demand shocks are i.i.d. across time and so the firm does not learn demand 
over time.  Demand shocks are also i.i.d. across customers and only one sales rep can work with 
each customer, so that there is no competition between sales people. 
We will also initially assume that both the firm and the sales rep are risk-neutral.  This ensures 
that the findings cannot be attributed to the (mere) allocation of risk.  We will later show that 
the findings survive when the agent is risk averse.  We normalize the sales rep’s outside options 
to zero.  The sales rep holds limited liability to the firm, and is guaranteed to receive 
nonnegative wages.  The limited liability assumption is common in the literature (e.g., Bester 
and Krähmer 2008; Bergmann and Friedl 2008; Shin 2008; and Simester and Zhang 2010).  It 
rules out the possibility that the firm sells its business to the sales rep.  This assumption is also 
plausible because employees generally retain the right to leave the firm ex post at any time.3
                                                          
3 For this reason, limited liability has sometimes been justified by laws prohibiting indentured servitude.  It also 
appears to be consistent with what we observe in practice.  More recently, the threat of employees leaving has 
hindered the finance industry in its efforts to introduce negative wages to manage risk taking.   
  In 
particular, if the sales rep can leave the firm before paying any punishment, the firm must 
design its incentive scheme as if the sales rep were protected with nonnegative wages.  We will 
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nevertheless also investigate relaxing the limited liability assumption later.4
First Best 
  Finally, we 
normalize the firm’s marginal cost of producing the good to zero. 
Suppose the firm and the sales rep are integrated and they observe the demand state before 
they choose whether to incur selling effort.  The return on selling effort is 𝑣𝐻 − 𝑣𝐿  if demand is 
high, and 𝑣𝐿 if demand is low.  For the rest of the paper we assume that selling effort is 
worthwhile in both demand states:5
(1) 𝑣𝐻 − 𝑣𝐿 > 𝑒𝐻 
 
(2) 𝑣𝐿 > 𝑒𝐿 
It follows that the integrated entity will exert selling effort and will charge an efficient price of 
𝑣𝐻 if demand is high and 𝑣𝐿 if demand is low.  The first-best expected profit is 
 𝔼𝜋∗ = 𝑢(𝑣𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻) + (1 − 𝑢)(𝑣𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿) 
Price Delegation 
If the firm and the sales rep are not integrated, the firm must design an incentive scheme to 
influence the sales rep’s reporting of demand and effort decisions.  We will focus on settings in 
which the firm chooses to sell in both demand conditions.  Under this assumption (which we 
will later formalize) the firm will want to elicit demand information from the sales rep, and will 
pay the sales rep a positive commission conditional on the price charged.6
                                                          
4 Notice that the joint assumptions of limited liability and the sales rep’s outside option being zero cannot be 
interpreted as a mere re-scaling of the parameters.  This is an additional reason for exploring the impact of relaxing 
the limited liability assumption.  
  In particular, the 
firm will accept the sales rep’s reporting of demand by charging the price 𝑣𝐻 and offering a 
commission of 𝑤𝐻 if the sales rep claims that demand is high, and charging 𝑣𝐿 and offering a 
5 In subsequent analysis, we make analogous assumptions to Conditions (1) and (2) to ensure that the firm wants 
to induce selling effort in equilibrium. 
6 If the sales rep fails to sell, the firm should optimally pay zero given the limited liability assumption. 
10 | P a g e  
 
commission 𝑤𝐿 if the sales rep claims that demand is low.  To find 𝑤𝐻 and 𝑤𝐿 the firm 
maximizes its expected profit by solving the following problem: 
  max𝑤𝐻, 𝑤𝐿≥0   𝔼𝜋𝑃 = 𝑢(𝑣𝐻 − 𝑤𝐻) + (1 − 𝑢)(𝑣𝐿 − 𝑤𝐿) 
s.t. 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 ≥ 0     (ICL
 𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻 ≥ 𝑤𝐿    (IC
)  
H
 𝑢(𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻) + (1 − 𝑢)(𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿) ≥ 0 (IR) ) 
The IC (incentive compatibility) constraints ensure that the sales rep exerts selling effort and 
truthfully states the demand condition.  When demand is low, the sales rep enjoys a deviation 
payoff of at most 0 by either shirking selling effort or overstating demand.  When demand is 
high, however, the best deviation payoff is 𝑤𝐿 because the sales rep can understate demand, 
sell at price 𝑣𝐿 and receive the commission 𝑤𝐿 without making any selling effort.  The firm must 
pay the sale rep an information rent for him to admit that demand is high.   
The IR (individual rationality) constraint ensures that the sales rep is willing to accept the 
contract – his expected net payoff must be no worse than his outside option 0.  In equilibrium 
both IC constraints are binding while the IR and limited liability constraints (𝑤𝐻,𝑤𝐿 ≥ 0) hold 
with slack.  It follows that the optimal commissions are 𝑤𝐿 = 𝑒𝐿 and 𝑤𝐻 = 𝑒𝐻 + 𝑒𝐿, and the 
firm earns an expected profit of 
  𝔼𝜋𝑃∗ = 𝑢(𝑣𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻 − 𝑒𝐿) + (1 − 𝑢)(𝑣𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿) = 𝔼𝜋∗ − 𝑢𝑒𝐿 
It can be easily shown that, by Condition (1), price delegation is more profitable than simply 
charging a low price 𝑣𝐿  and offering a commission of 𝑒𝐿 all of the time.  This would result in the 
firm selling in both demand states but charging an inefficiently low price when demand is high.  
However, the firm could serve the high demand condition exclusively by always charging a high 
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price 𝑣𝐻 and offering a commission of 𝑒𝐻.
7
(3) (1 − 𝑢)𝑣𝐿 > 𝑒𝐿 
  To rule out this trivial outcome we assume that the 
firm prefers to sell in both demand states, which requires that:  
In the rest of the paper we will treat the expected profit under price delegation as the 
benchmark and compare it with the expected profit of lobbying. 
We conclude this section with three observations.  First, as we discussed earlier, conditioning 
the price charged on the sales rep’s price report is equivalent to delegating pricing authority to 
the sales rep (Lal 1986).  Although the firm actually sets the prices, because it always follows 
the sales rep’s demand report, we obtain the same outcome if the sales rep sets prices directly.  
Of course, because compensation depends upon the price that the customer pays, the sales rep 
has an incentive to charge the correct price. 
Second, in this solution the sales rep’s commission depends upon the price rather than just the 
unit volume.  Notice that in our model where unit sales are either zero or one (and where the 
marginal cost of production is zero), price-based compensation is equivalent to both revenue-
based and margin-based compensation.  However, we recognize that in more general settings it 
may be possible to achieve the same level of revenue with different unit sales, and the role of 
marginal costs may be nontrivial.  It is in these settings that the distinctions between prices, 
revenue and margins become more meaningful.  We abstract away from these distinctions to 
focus on the key question of interest – when should a firm impose a lobbying process rather 
than simply delegate the pricing decision to the sales rep? 
Finally, it is important to recognize that price delegation cannot on its own restore the first-best 
profit.  Although the firm is able to condition prices on demand information, to elicit demand 
information it pays the sales rep in the high demand state an information rent of 𝑤𝐿 = 𝑒𝐿.  This 
                                                          
7 Because of Condition (1) this dominates the alternative of always charging the low price 𝑣𝐿 and offering a 
commission of 0 (and again selling only in the high demand condition). 
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helps explain why companies often find price delegation inadequate, and represents a standard 
result in the agency literature (Laffont and Martimort 2002).  Indeed, up until this point, we 
have presented a standard agency model describing the distortions that result from the 
presence of information asymmetry.  In the next section, we depart from this standard model 
by introducing lobbying as a screening mechanism.  In particular, we investigate if the firm can 
do better than price delegation by requiring that the sales rep lobby for lower prices.   
§ 3. Lobbying 
A frequent observation from our interviews is that firms require the sales rep to “acquire 
convincing evidence of low demand” in order to lobby for a lower price.  In the 
telecommunications and military contractor examples, the sales force searches through 
historical transactions to find evidence that past discounts contributed to additional sales.  In 
modeling terms, we can think of this information acquisition process as the sales rep searching 
for “signals” to support claims that demand is low and justify the recommendation to lower 
prices.  The sales rep incurs effort to draw signals of demand without knowing whether any 
individual signal will indicate that demand is high or low.  He can continue to search for 
evidence of low demand by making additional draws. 
The firm can decide whether to require evidence of low demand before agreeing to lower 
prices.  We interpret this as a decision about whether to require lobbying.  We will show that it 
may be profitable to require lobbying, even where the cost of lobbying represents a 
deadweight loss.  The firm may also vary how much evidence is required before it will lower 
prices, and in some situations it may also be able to influence the cost of searching for that 
evidence.  We investigate how the firm will make these decisions, and how the outcome will be 
influenced by the accuracy of the demand signals. 
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Firm Requires One Signal of Low Demand 
We begin by considering whether the firm will require a signal that demand is low.  Assume 
that each demand signal drawn by a sales rep could indicate whether demand is high or low 
and that the signals are i.i.d. conditional on the true state of demand.  In particular, the signal 
generating process is characterized by the following conditional probabilities: 
 Pr(high signal | high demand) = Pr(low signal | low demand) = 𝑟 
where 𝑟 ∈ (1/2, 1) measures the precision of demand signals.  Demand signals are noisy yet 
diagnostic of demand.8
Given these assumptions, the number of draws needed until the encounter of a low signal 
follows the negative binomial distribution.  The expected number of draws is 1/(1 − 𝑟) if 
demand is high and is 1/𝑟 if demand is low.  Naturally, fewer draws are needed if demand is 
truly low.  In addition, the more precise the demand signals are (the closer 𝑟 is to 1), the fewer 
draws are needed if demand is low, and the more draws are needed if demand is high.  That is, 
more precise demand signals polarize the lobbying costs between the two demand states.  
    
The sales rep incurs a search cost 𝑐 > 0 for each draw of a demand signal.  This could represent 
the cost of researching historical transactions or documenting the intensity of competition in 
the marketplace.  We recognize that besides search cost there may be other costs associated 
with lobbying.  In particular, there may an opportunity cost of foregone time spend on more 
productive sales activities, such as interacting with customers.  We will later consider this 
possibility as an extension. 
We now derive the firm’s optimal contract offer under this lobbying mechanism.  Let 𝑤𝐻 
denote the commission for selling at the high price 𝑣𝐻, and let 𝑤𝐿 denote the commission for 
                                                          
8 This assumption is consistent with the premise of demand measurement, that market data are noisy yet 
reflective of the true state of demand. 
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selling at the discounted price 𝑣𝐿.  The firm solves the following optimization problem, where 
“𝐸1” denotes requiring one piece of evidence that demand is low: 
 max𝑤𝐻, 𝑤𝐿≥0   𝔼𝜋𝐸1 = 𝑢(𝑣𝐻 − 𝑤𝐻) + (1 − 𝑢)(𝑣𝐿 − 𝑤𝐿) 
s.t. 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐/𝑟 ≥ 0     (ICL
 𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻 ≥ max[0,𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐/(1 − 𝑟)]   (IC )  H
 𝑢(𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻) + (1 − 𝑢)(𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐/𝑟) ≥ 0 (IR) ) 
We begin with some preliminary observations.  The firm will want to induce selling effort in 
both demand states.  If the firm does not induce selling effort when demand is high, the 
customer’s willingness-to-pay can only be 𝑣𝐿 or 0, and the firm might as well mandate a 
constant price of 𝑣𝐿.  If the firm induces selling effort when demand is high but does not when 
demand is low, willingness-to-pay will be 𝑣𝐻 if demand is high and 0 otherwise.  The firm 
should then mandate a constant price of 𝑣𝐻.  Both outcomes defeat the purpose of enforcing a 
lobbying mechanism.  Moreover, the firm will respond to lobbying by cutting prices, otherwise 
the sales rep will not engage in costly lobbying in either demand condition.9
When demand is low, the sales rep earns an expected net payoff of 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐/𝑟 by exerting 
selling effort and lobbying.  His best deviation payoff is 0: he will not be able to earn the 
commission if he shirks selling effort or if he does not lobby.  When demand is high, the sales 
rep earns a net payoff of 𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻 by exerting selling effort and not lobbying.  However, if he 
lobbies he can sell effortlessly and earn an expected surplus of 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐/(1 − 𝑟).  He is also 
guaranteed a payoff of 0 by simply doing nothing.  Hence the optimal commissions are 
  Finally, to elicit 
truthful reporting of demand information, the firm will want the sales rep to lobby for a low 
price only when demand is low.   
 𝑤𝐿 = 𝑒𝐿 + 𝑐/𝑟  
 𝑤𝐻 = 𝑒𝐻 + max [0, 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑔(𝑟)𝑐] 
                                                          
9 In the extensions section we show that the firm will always respond to lobbying.  Also, there is no room for the 
firm to renegotiate the contract after agreeing to a price cut because the sales rep is left with no rent. 
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where 𝑔(𝑟) = 1/(1 − 𝑟) − 1/𝑟 for notational simplicity.  It is easy to show that 𝑔(𝑟) > 0 and 
𝑔(𝑟)′ > 0 over (1/2, 1).  Using these optimal commissions, the firm earns an expected profit of  
 𝔼𝜋𝐸1∗ = 𝔼𝜋∗ − 𝑢max[0, 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑔(𝑟)𝑐] − (1 − 𝑢)𝑐/𝑟 
We are interested in whether this lobbying mechanism can improve the firm’s expected profit 
beyond price delegation.  Both mechanisms lead to the same efficient pricing decisions, but 
differ in their associated payroll costs.  With the lobbying mechanism the firm essentially 
subsidizes the sales rep’s expected lobbying cost 𝑐/𝑟 when demand is low, but pays the sales 
rep a rent of max[0, 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑔(𝑟)𝑐] rather than 𝑒𝐿 when demand is high.  This amounts to a saving 
of min[𝑒𝐿 ,𝑔(𝑟)𝑐] in information rent.  Hence, this lobbying mechanism improves expected 
profit beyond price delegation iff  
(4) 𝑢min[𝑒𝐿 ,𝑔(𝑟)𝑐] > (1 − 𝑢)𝑐/𝑟 
Intuitively, through the lobbying mechanism the firm harnesses the sales rep’s private 
information in the low demand condition to avoiding paying information rents in the high 
demand condition.  This benefit is greater when demand is more likely to be high (larger 𝑢), and 
when the information rent is higher under price delegation (larger 𝑒𝐿).  In addition, Condition 
(4) is more likely to hold with higher values of 𝑟.  When demand signals are more accurate, 
lobbying is less costly for the sales rep when demand is low and is more costly when demand is 
high, which makes the lobbying process more effective at eliciting truthful demand information. 
It is important to recognize that the firm can choose what represents “evidence” of low 
demand.  This provides an important opportunity to improve the efficiency of the lobbying 
mechanism.  When choosing what represents evidence, the firm should choose signals that are 
easy to obtain when demand is low, but hard to obtain when demand is high.  For example, a 
manager at the African beverage manufacturer described how his sales force gathers evidence 
of competitors’ “dealer communications” that reveal the competitors’ prices.  Should the firm 
accept evidence that a competitor is charging lower prices as evidence of the need to lower the 
price to all dealers?  The answer depends upon how easy it is to find this evidence.   If the 
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competitor charges the same price to all dealers, then evidence that this price is low may 
indeed represent sufficient evidence to lower the price.  However, if the competitor charges 
different prices across dealers, so that it is always possible to find examples of some dealers 
who are getting lower prices, then the firm should generally not accept this as evidence to 
lower prices to other dealers.   
In an alternative example, customers’ willingness-to-pay may depend on word-of-mouth about 
product performance.  To approve any price discount, the firm may require evidence of 
negative world-of-mouth.  The chance of observing negative word-of-mouth signals is higher if 
product performance is indeed perceived more poorly.10
Interestingly, in the Technical Appendix we show that the firm’s expected profit can increase 
with the search cost 𝑐.  This result reflects a trade-off between two forces.  On the negative 
side, a higher search cost increases the lobbying cost when demand is low, which the firm has 
to subsidize.  On the positive side, it discourages lobbying when demand is high, which reduces 
the information rent.  Higher accuracy of demand signals (𝑟) diminishes the negative side and 
amplifies the positive side because finding an accurate, negative signal is disproportionately 
hard if demand is high.  Therefore, if evidence is sufficiently accurate, higher search costs can 
increase the effectiveness of the lobbying system.   
   
The above result leads to the following question – what should the optimal search cost be if the 
firm is able to influence it?  In the context of our examples, the African beverage company can 
choose how much infrastructural support to provide for its sales reps to visit distributors and 
dealers, and the military contractor can choose the accessibility of historical transaction data to 
its sales force.  In the Technical Appendix we derive a positive optimal search cost 𝑐∗ = 𝑒𝐿/
                                                          
10 Recall also the example of the military contractor whose sales force used an example of a past transaction 
leading to additional sales as evidence that lowering the price to a new customer was justified.  If the original 
customer had the same characteristics as the new customer, then the firm might decide this represents sufficient 
evidence to justify a discount.  However, if the original and new customers are different then the firm may decide 
not to accept this as sufficient evidence.  Other examples include a sales rep’s claims that a customer is also 
requesting prices from competitors.  The firm should only lower the price if these claims can be substantiated by 
evidence (such as customers’ printed price comparisons from the Internet).  
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𝑔(𝑟).  This result echoes observations that companies often allow lobbying but make the 
process “somewhat difficult” for the sales people.  If lobbying is too frustrating, sales people 
who truly face low demand cannot easily communicate this information; if lobbying is reduced 
to a rubber stamp, sales people in favorable markets will argue for a low price as well.11
In some situations, it may be difficult for the firm to directly control the sales rep’s search cost.  
For these firms an alternative is to vary the amount of evidence required before agreeing to 
lower prices.  In terms of our model, the firm can decide how many signals of low demand are 
required before it is willing to approve a discount.  We analyze this decision next. 
  
How Much Evidence of Low Demand Should the Firm Require? 
Suppose the firm requires the sales rep to provide 𝑛 signals of low demand.  The firm chooses 
the value of 𝑛 as well as the commissions to maximize its expected profit (we will later refer to 
this model as the “main model” and compare various extensions against it): 
 max𝑤𝐻, 𝑤𝐿,𝑛≥0   𝔼𝜋𝐸 = 𝑢(𝑣𝐻 − 𝑤𝐻) + (1 − 𝑢)(𝑣𝐿 − 𝑤𝐿) 
s.t. 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛/𝑟 ≥ 0     (ICL
 𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻 ≥ max[0,𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛/(1 − 𝑟)]  (IC )  H
 𝑢(𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻) + (1 − 𝑢)(𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛/𝑟) ≥ 0 (IR) ) 
Note that the expected number of draws the sales rep needs is 𝑛/(1 − 𝑟) if demand is high and 
is 𝑛/𝑟 if demand is low.  The difference, 𝑛/(1 − 𝑟) − 𝑛/𝑟 = 𝑛𝑔(𝑟), increases with 𝑛.  This 
result drives the firm’s trade-off in deciding how much evidence to require before approving a 
discount.  A higher bar (larger 𝑛) raises the lobbying costs in both demand states, which in turn 
increases the firm’s payroll costs.  However, a higher bar also increases the discriminatory 
power of the lobbying mechanism because it is disproportionately difficult to collect many low 
signals when demand is actually high.  To manage this trade-off the firm will want to choose an 
                                                          
11 The firm has no incentive to introduce a fixed cost of lobbying.  Doing so exacerbates the deadweight loss of 
lobbying without improving its screening power, because this fixed cost is the same across demand conditions.  
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“intermediate” value of 𝑛.  We solve the firm’s optimization problem in the Technical Appendix 
and obtain the following result. 
Proposition 1: If evidence is sufficiently accurate (𝑟 > 1
1+𝑢
), the firm should require 
evidence of low demand before approving a price discount.  The optimal number of low 
demand signals increases with the effort cost in the low demand condition (𝑒𝐿) and 
decreases with both the cost of search (𝑐) and the accuracy of evidence (𝑟).  
Proof: See the Technical Appendix. 
The optimal amount of evidence is given by 𝑛∗ = 𝑒𝐿/[𝑔(𝑟)𝑐].12
Notice that the sales rep’s search cost is a deadweight loss in this system, yet the firm is willing 
to introduce this loss in order to reclaim the rent it would otherwise pay when demand is high.  
When 𝑛 = 𝑛∗, the expected profit under the optimal lobbying mechanism is 
  The comparative statics of 𝑛∗ 
have intuitive interpretations.  First, recall that 𝑒𝐿 is the sales rep’s information rent in the high 
demand state under price delegation.  The larger this rent, the more the firm wants to extract it 
with an onerous evidence requirement.  Second, the sales rep’s search cost 𝑐 has a similar 
effect on profit as the required number of low signals; both make the lobbying system more 
costly yet more discerning as a screening mechanism.  Therefore, when acquiring evidence is 
costly, the firm will reduce the evidentiary requirement.  Finally, the more precise demand 
signals are, the more difficult it is to gather low signals when demand is actually high.  As a 
result, fewer low signals are needed to prevent the sales rep from understating demand. 
  𝔼𝜋𝐸∗ = 𝔼𝜋∗ − (1 − 𝑢)𝑐𝑛∗/𝑟 
This optimal lobbying mechanism introduces a deadweight loss of (1 − 𝑢)𝑐𝑛∗/𝑟, which equals 
the subsidy the firm pays the sales rep to cover his lobbying cost when demand is low.  
                                                          
12 To facilitate exposition, we ignore the discrete nature of 𝑛.  The solution for the discrete case can be derived 
using the same logic. 
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However, the firm is able to eliminate the sales rep’s information rent when demand is high.  
This result reflects the different implications of the costly lobbying process.  From the social 
efficiency perspective, lobbying is wasteful.  From the firm’s perspective, the costly nature of 
lobbying helps it recover information rents from the sales force.  
Summary 
In this section we have shown that the firm can use the lobbying mechanism to reduce the 
information rent it pays to the sales rep when demand is high.  Lobbying can improve expected 
profit beyond price delegation, even though it is an unproductive activity that leads to 
additional bureaucracy.  We model the lobbying mechanism as the requirement that the sales 
rep must provide evidence that demand is low before the firm agrees to a discount.  We show 
that the firm will define what constitutes evidence of low demand by choosing signals that are 
easy to obtain when demand is truly low, but difficult to obtain if demand is high.  The firm can 
also control how much evidence is required before it will agree to a discount.  As long as the 
evidence is sufficiently accurate, the firm will require substantial evidence.  The firm may also 
make the search for evidence more cumbersome, even though increasing this administrative 
burden contributes an additional deadweight loss.   
§ 4. Extensions  
In this section, we explore how the optimal design and the ultimate efficacy of the lobbying 
mechanism change in the following scenarios: the sales rep’s lobbying effort constrains his 
selling effort, the sales rep is risk averse, the firm can acquire evidence of demand on its own, 
the firm can punish the sales rep (by paying negative wages), or the firm can respond to 
lobbying randomly.  In each of these scenarios we ask: How much evidence should the firm 
require in designing its lobbying mechanism?  Should the firm use the lobbying mechanism or 
price delegation? 
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When Lobbying Constrains Selling 
The time and energy a sales rep spends on lobbying might limit the extent of effort he can 
invest in other (more productive) selling activities.  How should the firm adjust its evidentiary 
requirement for lobbying?  One might expect the firm to lower its requirement because 
searching for more evidence is especially wasteful when it results in an opportunity cost.  
However, we find that the opposite may be true.  We collect the full analysis in the Technical 
Appendix, and present an example in Figure 1.   
The upper curve of Figure 1 plots the firm’s expected profit as a function of its evidentiary 
requirement when searching for evidence does not constrain selling, where 𝑛∗ denotes the 
optimal number of low signals required.  The lower curve corresponds to the case in which 
searching for evidence does constrain selling.  The optimal number of low signals required, as 
denoted by 𝑛𝐶∗ , is higher.  Notice that the firm can waive the evidentiary requirement 
altogether (𝑛 = 0) and implement price delegation.  The fact that 𝑛𝐶∗ > 0 in Figure 1 indicates 
that the lobbying mechanism can generate higher expected profit than price delegation. 
Figure 1: The Firm May Raise Its Evidentiary Requirement If Lobbying Constrains Selling 
 
 
Notes: This figure sets 𝑣𝐻 = 1, 𝑣𝐿 = 0.8, 𝑒𝐻 = 𝑒𝐿 = 0.1, 𝑐 = 0.006, 𝑢 = 0.6, and 𝑟 = 0.7. 
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When lobbying prevents the sales rep from exerting full selling effort, the firm must offer a 
higher commission 𝑤𝐿 in the low demand state to compensate the sales rep for the risk of 
losing this commission.  A higher 𝑤𝐿 makes it more attractive for the sales rep to claim that 
demand is low.  Raising the evidentiary requirement helps the firm counter this tendency, 
although it also increases the lobbying cost when demand is actually low.  We prove the 
following result. 
Proposition 2:  The firm may require more evidence of low demand when the search for 
evidence constrains selling effort than when it does not.  
Proof: See the Technical Appendix. 
Recall that the socially efficient amount of lobbying is zero.  The surprising insight of 
Proposition 2 is that the equilibrium amount of lobbying may increase further if lobbying is 
more wasteful.  When lobbying erodes selling, the lobbying mechanism is less effective as a 
screening device, and the firm may raise the evidentiary bar to restore its discriminatory power. 
When the Sales Rep is Risk Averse 
The lobbying mechanism begets uncertainty.  In either demand state, the sales rep’s search for 
signals of low demand is governed by a random process, and the cost of lobbying is a random 
variable.  In contrast, the sales rep’s payoff in each demand state is deterministic under price 
delegation.  If the sales rep is risk averse, this may affect the design of the lobbying mechanism 
and the firm’s choice between price delegation and lobbying.13
We present the analysis in the Technical Appendix.  In summary, a risk averse sales rep derives 
a disutility from the inherent uncertainty of the search process.  To induce the sales rep to 
 
                                                          
13 The sales rep faces ex ante demand uncertainty under both price delegation and lobbying.  However, the sales 
rep’s ex post participation constraint is satisfied because of the limited liability assumption, which in turn means 
that the sales rep’s ex ante participation constraint is satisfied regardless of his risk preferences.  Therefore, risk 
aversion only affects the lobbying mechanism (and the firm’s choice between price delegation and lobbying) 
through the search process. 
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lobby when demand is low, the firm must offer a commission greater than the sales rep’s cost 
of selling and expected cost of search.  The higher the evidentiary requirement, the greater this 
extra commission.  This effect is in favor of lowering the evidentiary requirement or abandoning 
lobbying altogether (in favor of price delegation).   
However, there is a countervailing effect.  Due to the disutility of uncertainty, a risk averse sales 
rep is also reluctant to search when demand is high.  Moreover, searching for low demand 
signals is associated with greater uncertainty when demand is high than when demand is low.  
To fulfill the requirement of 𝑛 signal of low demand, the number of draws needed is associated 
with a variance of 𝑛𝑟(1−𝑟)2 when demand is high and a lower variance of 𝑛(1−𝑟)𝑟2  when demand is 
low.  Therefore, a higher evidentiary requirement serves to strengthen the screening power of 
the lobbying mechanism.  
The tradeoff between these two effects determines the optimal design of the lobbying 
mechanism and the firm’s choice between price delegation and lobbying.  For concreteness, we 
assume that the sales rep’s utility function is exponential such that the sales rep exhibits 
constant absolute risk aversion.  The exponential utility function is often adopted for its 
analytical tractability.  This allows us to derive the firm’s optimal contract in closed form and to 
analyze the comparative statics with respect to the sales rep’s degree of risk aversion.   
As the sales rep’s degree of risk aversion increases, the firm must offer a greater commission 
for the low demand state to induce lobbying.  Meanwhile, the screening power of the lobbying 
mechanism also increases, and a lower evidentiary requirement suffices to fully extract the 
sales rep’s rent in the high demand state.  The second effect dominates in the case of 
exponential utilities.  The net result is that the firm’s expected profit from the lobbying 
mechanism increases with the sales rep’s degree of risk aversion.   
Finally, recall that the firm’s expected profit under price delegation does not depend on the 
sales rep’s degree of risk aversion.  Therefore, as risk aversion increases the firm may end up 
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being more willing to choose lobbying over price delegation, although lobbying looms as a more 
“risky” mechanism to the sales rep. 
When the Firm Can Acquire Evidence on Its Own 
In some markets the firm may be able to acquire evidence of demand on its own.  The question 
is whether doing so can improve profit beyond lobbying.  In particular, we consider the 
following “verification” mechanism – the sales rep makes a claim about the state of demand.  If 
the sales rep claims that demand is low, the firm verifies this claim by acquiring evidence of 
demand on its own.  The firm will approve the price discount if and only if there is “sufficient 
evidence” of low demand.   
Note that the firm could also conduct a “blanket search” – it could acquire evidence of demand 
on its own without conditioning its search decision on the sales rep’s claims of demand.  
However, blanket search is strictly dominated by verification.  We present the proof in the 
Technical Appendix.  This is because verification helps the firm elicit demand information from 
the sales rep, and this information saves the firm the cost of search when demand is high. 
We start with a simple verification mechanism to gain more intuition.  Consider the following 
contract.  If the sales rep asks for a high price 𝑣𝐻, the firm will always agree.  If the sales rep 
asks for a low price 𝑣𝐿, the firm will search for one signal of demand on its own.  If the signal is 
low, the firm will agree to charge a low price.  If the signal is high, the firm will charge the high 
price instead.  The sales rep does not need to collect evidence of low demand.  To facilitate 
comparison, assume that the firm and the sales rep incur the same search cost 𝑐 for each draw 
of demand signals.   
The verification process gives the firm greater contractual freedom in setting its commissions.  
A sale now occurs in three possible ways: the sales rep requests (and always obtains) the high 
price, requests and obtains the low price, requests the low price but obtains the high price.  
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Correspondingly, the firm offers a commission of 𝑤𝐻, 𝑤𝐿, and 𝑤𝐻′  upon sale.  The firm chooses 
these commissions to maximize the expected profit of this simple verification mechanism: 
 max𝑤𝐻, 𝑤𝐻′ , 𝑤𝐿≥0   𝔼𝜋𝑉1 = 𝑢(𝑣𝐻 − 𝑤𝐻) + (1 − 𝑢)[𝑟(𝑣𝐿 − 𝑤𝐿) − 𝑐] 
s.t. 𝑟(𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿) ≥ 0     (ICL
 𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻 ≥ 𝑟max(𝑤𝐻′ − 𝑒𝐻, 0) + (1 − 𝑟)𝑤𝐿 (IC )  H
 𝑢(𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻) + (1 − 𝑢)𝑟(𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿) ≥ 0  (IR) ) 
This optimization problem is interpreted as follows.  If demand is low and the sales rep asks for 
a low price, the firm will approve this price with probability 𝑟, which equals the probability that 
the firm finds a signal of low demand in one draw.  The sales rep earns 0 by not exerting selling 
effort, and 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 by exerting selling effort once the discount is approved; he has no incentive 
to make selling effort if the discount is turned down.14
If demand is high and the sales rep asks for a low price, with probability 𝑟 he will fail 
verification.  In this case, he will earn 𝑤𝐻′ − 𝑒𝐻 if he exerts selling effort and 0 otherwise.
  Meanwhile, the sales rep earns a 
maximum surplus of 0 by asking for a high price.  Therefore, to induce the sales rep to request a 
low price and exert selling effort (once the request is approved), the firm must offer 𝑤𝐿 = 𝑒𝐿 . 
15
It follows that the simple verification mechanism generates an expected profit of 
  with 
probability 1 − 𝑟 he will obtain the low price and earn the commission 𝑤𝐿 without selling 
effort.  Therefore, the sales rep earns an expected surplus of 𝑟max(𝑤𝐻′ − 𝑒𝐻, 0) + (1 − 𝑟)𝑤𝐿 if 
he asks for a low price.  If the sales rep asks for a high price, he earns 𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻 if he exerts 
selling effort and 0 if he does not.  To induce the sales rep to request a high price and exert 
selling effort, the firm must offer 𝑤𝐻′ ∈ [0, 𝑒𝐻] and 𝑤𝐻 = 𝑒𝐻 + (1 − 𝑟)𝑒𝐿. 
                                                          
14 The firm will prefer to let the sales rep condition his selling effort on the outcome of verification.  If the sales rep 
must choose his selling effort before observing the outcome of verification, the firm will have to offer a higher 
commission 𝑤𝐿  to induce selling effort.  
15 We derive the optimal value of 𝑤𝐻′  assuming that the firm can commit to its commission offers.  If the firm 
cannot commit, it will want to offer 𝑤𝐻′ = 𝑒𝐻 to induce selling effort in case demand is high.  However, this does 
not change the firm’s optimal choice of 𝑤𝐻  or its expected profit from the verification mechanism.  The key is that 
the sales rep earns zero surpluses whenever his discount request fails verification, which discourages the sales rep 
to understate demand. 
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 𝔼𝜋𝑉1∗ = 𝔼𝜋∗ − 𝑢(1 − 𝑟)𝑒𝐿 − (1 − 𝑢)(1 − 𝑟)(𝑣𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿) − (1 − 𝑢)𝑐 
This profit function illustrates the pros and cons of the verification mechanism.  On the positive 
side, when demand is high the firm pays less information rent (in the amount of (1 − 𝑟)𝑒𝐿 as 
opposed to 𝑒𝐿), because the possibility of failing verification makes it less tempting for the sales 
rep to understate demand.  On the negative side, when demand is low the firm faces the 
possibility of not granting a truly needed low price and thus losing the customer.  In addition, 
the firm must pay for its own cost of search.  Given these pros and cons, how should the firm 
choose between verification and lobbying?  To answer this question, we next derive the 
optimal verification mechanism. 
The key decision for the firm is what amounts to “sufficient evidence” of low demand.  Without 
loss of generality, sufficient evidence is defined as “finding at least 𝑛 signals of low demand 
within the first 𝑘 draws” – given the demand signal generating process, the sequence by which 
these signals arrive does not affect the probability of observing sufficient evidence.  The 
probability of passing verification is 𝜙𝐿(𝑛,𝑘) = ∑ �𝑘𝑖�𝑟𝑖(1 − 𝑟)𝑘−𝑖𝑘𝑖=𝑛  if demand is low and is 
𝜙𝐻(𝑛,𝑘) = ∑ �𝑘𝑖�𝑟𝑘−𝑖(1 − 𝑟)𝑖𝑘𝑖=𝑛  if demand is high. 
Following the same logic of the simple example above, we derive the firm’s optimal commission 
offers as 𝑤𝐿 = 𝑒𝐿, 𝑤𝐻′ ∈ [0, 𝑒𝐻], and 𝑤𝐻 = 𝑒𝐻 + 𝜙𝐻(𝑛,𝑘)𝑒𝐿.  The optimal verification 
mechanism generates an expected profit of16
 𝔼𝜋𝑉∗ = 𝑢(𝑣𝐻 − 𝑤𝐻) + (1 − 𝑢)[𝜙𝐿(𝑛,𝑘)(𝑣𝐿 − 𝑤𝐿) − 𝑐𝑘] 
 
 = 𝔼𝜋∗ − 𝑢𝜙𝐻(𝑛,𝑘)𝑒𝐿 − (1 − 𝑢)[1 − 𝜙𝐿(𝑛,𝑘)](𝑣𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿) − (1 − 𝑢)𝑐𝑘 
                                                          
16 Note that random verification is never optimal.  Suppose the firm can commit to a verification probability 
𝛾 ∈ [0, 1].  It follows that the firm will pay an information rent of [1 − 𝛾 + 𝛾𝜙𝐻(𝑛, 𝑘)]𝑒𝐿  in the high demand state, 
loses the business with probability 𝛾[1 − 𝜙𝐿(𝑛, 𝑘)] in the low demand state, and incurs an expected search cost of (1 − 𝑢)𝛾𝑐𝑘.  The firm’s expected profit is linear in 𝛾.  Therefore, the optimal value of 𝛾 is either 1 or 0: the firm 
either always verifies the sales rep’s claims of low demand or never verifies these claims – a scenario equivalent to 
price delegation. 
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Intuitively, the firm will want to make it easy for the sales rep’s discount request to pass 
verification when demand is low, and make it difficult when demand is high.  This amounts to 
increasing 𝜙𝐿(𝑛,𝑘) and decreasing 𝜙𝐻(𝑛,𝑘).  Meanwhile, the firm will want to reduce its total 
search cost (lower 𝑘).  We derive the optimal values of 𝑛 and 𝑘 in the Technical Appendix and 
obtain the following result. 
Proposition 3: If evidence of demand is sufficiently accurate (𝑟 sufficiently high), the 
firm should use the lobbying mechanism instead of verification. 
Proof: See the Technical Appendix. 
The intuition is as follows.  First, verification as a screening mechanism inherently begets errors.  
There is always a positive chance that the sales rep will fail verification even if demand is low 
(Type 1 error) and pass verification even if demand is high (Type 2 error).  As a result, 
verification can never eliminate the sales rep’s information rent when demand is high, and it 
always leads to lost sales when demand is low.  In comparison, the lobbying mechanism 
eliminates the sales rep’s information rent if demand signals are sufficiently accurate, because 
the difficulty of meeting the evidentiary requirement makes lobbying infeasible to the sales rep.  
Moreover, the lobbying mechanism does not erode sales when demand is low, because the 
firm will always respond to lobbying in equilibrium.17
There is a second and more subtle reason.  It has to do with the deadweight cost of search 
generated by either mechanism.  When demand signals are sufficiently accurate, the sales rep 
does not have to search too “redundantly” to meet the evidentiary threshold – to collect 𝑛 
signals of low demand, he needs 𝑛/𝑟 draws in expectation, which gets closer to 𝑛 when 𝑟 
approaches 1.  Under the verification mechanism, however, the firm cannot set the total 
 
                                                          
17 This is true unless the sales rep faces a binding effort capacity such as when lobbying diverts attention from 
selling.  But even in this case lobbying is still more profitable than verification if demand signals are sufficiently 
accurate.  Under the lobbying mechanism, the firm eliminates the sales rep’s information rent when demand is 
high, and does not require excessively redundant search when demand is low.  Finally, if demand signals are 
sufficiently accurate, a minimum evidentiary requirement suffices, which allows the sales rep to spend more effort 
on selling.  See Figure V1 in the Technical Appendix for an example.  
27 | P a g e  
 
number of draws 𝑘 too close to the evidentiary threshold 𝑛.  In fact, the optimal value of 𝑘 is 
more than twice as large as 𝑛 (for reasons that we explain in the Technical Appendix).  This fact 
makes verification a more “wasteful” mechanism than lobbying when demand signals are 
sufficiently accurate.   
When the Firm Can Punish the Sales Rep 
We have assumed that the sales rep earns a minimum wage of zero.  We extend the analysis by 
allowing the firm to punish the sales rep up to some amount 𝐹 > 0.  We continue to assume 
that the sales rep’s outside opportunity is normalized as zero.  In addition, once the sales rep 
has accepted the contract, he is “locked in” with the firm over the contract duration (otherwise 
the negative wage would be meaningless).  For the sales rep to accept the contract in the first 
place, his ex ante expected surplus must be nonnegative.   
We present the full analysis in the Technical Appendix.  In equilibrium, the firm always punishes 
the sales rep if he fails to sell.  In addition, we derive a cutoff value 𝐹� = 𝑢𝑒𝐿.  If the firm is 
allowed to severely punish the sales rep (𝐹 ≥ 𝐹�), it should use price delegation.  In doing so, 
the firm will be able to restore the first-best expected profit.  If the firm is only allowed to 
moderately punish the sales rep (𝐹 < 𝐹�), it should require lobbying if evidence of demand is 
sufficiently accurate (𝑟 > 1/(1 + 𝑟)) and use price delegation otherwise.  Compared with the 
main model of Section 3, the lobbying mechanism imposes a lower evidentiary threshold and 
generates a higher expected profit, although it still cannot restore the first-best expected profit. 
The intuition is as follows.  In the main model, under price delegation the sales rep enjoys an 
information rent when demand is high.  Lobbying helps the firm reduce this information rent.  
Punishment serves as an alternative rent-reduction device.  Being able to punish the sales rep 
allows the firm to induce selling effort with smaller commissions in both demand states.  
Moreover, cutting the commission in the low demand state makes it less attractive for a sales 
rep in the high demand state to pretend that demand is low.  If the firm is able to severely 
punish the sales rep, price delegation suffices to restore the first-best expected profit.   
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If punishment is limited, so is its rent-extraction power.  The firm will have to rely on a 
combination of punishment and lobbying if demand signals are precise enough.  However, even 
if punishment is limited, punishment allows the firm to lower its evidentiary requirement. This 
increases the firm’s profits because the firm ultimately bears the cost of searching for evidence. 
We conclude that our assumption that the sales rep cannot be punished is stricter than we 
require. We only require a limit on how large any negative wage can be. 
Would the Firm Respond to Lobbying Randomly? 
In the main model, the firm always responds to lobbying and lowers the price if the sales rep 
meets the evidentiary threshold.  Can the firm improve its expected profit by responding to 
lobbying stochastically?  We present the full analysis in the Technical Appendix and find the 
answer to be no.  This is because stochastic response to lobbying achieves the same effect as 
increasing the evidentiary threshold in terms of regulating the sales rep’s incentives.  Both 
make it more costly for the sales rep to obtain a price discount.  In fact, if the firm requires 𝑛 
signals of low demand and responds to lobbying with probability 𝜃, this mechanism in 
equilibrium is equivalent to requiring 𝑛/𝜃 signals of low demand but always responding to 
lobbying.  We show in the Technical Appendix that the sales rep receives the same commissions 
in equilibrium as in the main model.  However, stochastic response to lobbying brings an 
additional cost to the firm.  When demand is truly low, with probability 1 − 𝜃 the firm will 
ignore lobbying and miss the sale.  Therefore, the firm will respond to sufficient evidence by 
lowering the price, and will control the lobbying mechanism by adjusting the evidentiary 
threshold. 
Competition for the Sales Rep’s Services  
In this model we have restricted attention to a single firm.  However, in some markets there are 
multiple competing firms, which raises the issue of competition for the sales rep’s services.  If 
the sales rep’s switching costs are sufficiently low and the sales rep acquired the private 
information before contracting, then this could result in the firms competing on how much 
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surplus the sales rep receives.  One way that the firms might compete is by offering the sales 
rep more of the information rent in the high-demand state.  If the payoffs in the high-demand 
state are more attractive, then the sales rep has less incentive to deviate, which will lower the 
level of evidence that the firm will require before agreeing to a discount.  However, if there are 
multiple potential agents to hire and they agree on the contract before getting their private 
information we effectively return to the game that we model. 
Summary 
We have explored the boundaries of our argument by investigating how our results change 
when we relax different model assumptions.  The findings reveal that the profitability of 
lobbying is robust under a broad range of conditions. In particular, it may remain profitable to 
require lobbying for lower prices when: the sales force is risk averse, the firm can conduct its 
own verification, limited punishments (negative wages) are enforceable when sales goals are 
unmet, or even when there is an opportunity cost of engaging in lobbying.  Perhaps surprisingly, 
the relative profitability of lobbying may even increase in these scenarios if a lower evidentiary 
threshold suffices to induce truthful reporting of demand. 
In the next section we show that the intuition underlying the lobbying mechanism extends to a 
general model with minimum functional form assumptions. 
§ 5. General Model 
While our model has focused on two demand states, in general demand will take on a broader 
range of possible states.  This potentially complicates the design of the lobbying process as a 
single evidentiary threshold is no longer sufficient to discriminate between all of the demand 
states.  Instead, a complete screening mechanism will require a different evidentiary threshold 
for each of the demand states.  In this section we allow for a continuous distribution of demand 
states, which requires a continuous function of evidentiary thresholds in order for the firm to 
completely take advantage of the sales rep’s private information.   
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We generalize the model in the following way.  We continue to assume that a customer’s 
willingness-to-pay depends on the strength of demand 𝑣 and the sales rep’s selling effort.  
However, we allow the demand states 𝑣 to follow a generic p.d.f. 𝑓(𝑣) and c.d.f. 𝐹(𝑣) over [𝑣, 
𝑣].  Meanwhile, let the function 𝜀(𝑝, 𝑣) describe the cost of selling effort the sales rep must 
incur for a customer in demand state 𝑣 to be just willing to buy at price 𝑝.  We assume that, for 
a given price, less selling effort is required if demand is higher: 
(5) 𝜕𝜀(𝑝,𝑣)
𝜕𝑣
< 0 
Extending the main model, we use 𝑛(𝑣�) ≥ 0 to denote the number of low demand signals the 
sales rep must provide in order to claim that demand is 𝑣�.  Meanwhile, the sales rep has a 
probability 𝑏(𝑣) of finding a low signal in one shot of search when demand is 𝑣.  Search cost is 
again 𝑐 > 0 per draw.  Therefore, to claim that demand is 𝑣� when it is actually 𝑣, the sales rep 
must incur an expected lobbying cost of  
 𝑙(𝑣�, 𝑣) = 𝑐 𝑛(𝑣�)
𝑏(𝑣) 
Following the sales rep’s demand report 𝑣�, the firm sets the price 𝑝(𝑣�) and offers a commission 
𝑤(𝑣�) if the sales rep is able to sell at this price.  In equilibrium, the sales rep will incur just 
enough selling effort 𝜀[𝑝(𝑣�),𝑣] to earn this commission.  
The firm chooses the evidentiary threshold, price scheme and commission scheme to maximize 
its expected profit 𝔼𝜋𝐺  (“𝐺” for general):
18
 max𝑛(𝑣),𝑝(𝑣),𝑤(𝑣)≥0   𝔼𝜋𝐺 = ∫ [𝑝(𝑣) − 𝑤(𝑣)]𝑑𝐹(𝑣)𝑣𝑣  
 
s.t. 𝑤(𝑣) − 𝜀[𝑝(𝑣),𝑣] − 𝑙(𝑣, 𝑣) ≥ 𝑤(𝑣�) − 𝜀[𝑝(𝑣�),𝑣] − 𝑙(𝑣�, 𝑣), ∀ 𝑣� ≠ 𝑣 (IC)  
 𝑤(𝑣) − 𝜀[𝑝(𝑣),𝑣] − 𝑙(𝑣, 𝑣) ≥ 0,      ∀ 𝑣  (IR) 
                                                          
18 To simplify exposition, we assumed that the firm intends to serve consumers in all demand states.  This is 
analogous to Condition (3) of the main model. 
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where 𝑙(𝑣�, 𝑣) = 𝑐𝑛(𝑣�)/𝑏(𝑣).   
Let 𝑆(𝑣) denote the indirect surplus function given the sales rep’s truthful reporting of demand: 
 𝑆(𝑣) = 𝑤(𝑣�) − 𝜀[𝑝(𝑣�), 𝑣] − 𝑙(𝑣�, 𝑣)  |𝑣�=𝑣 
It follows from the envelope theorem (Mirrlees 1971) that  
(6) 𝑆′(𝑣) = −𝜕𝜀[𝑝(𝑣�),𝑣]
𝜕𝑣
−
𝜕𝑙(𝑣� ,𝑣)
𝜕𝑣
  |𝑣�=𝑣 
We will begin by establishing that a necessary requirement for lobbying to be profitable is that 
evidence of low demand is harder to obtain in high demand states.  In particular, a necessary 
condition is that the probability a single search draw yields evidence that demand is low, 𝑏(𝑣), 
decreases with demand: 𝑏′(𝑣) < 0.  It follows that the sales rep’s lobbying cost to obtain a 
given price 𝑝(𝑣�) is higher in higher demand states: 𝜕𝑙(𝑣� ,𝑣)
𝜕𝑣
= −𝑐 𝑛(𝑣�)𝑏′(𝑣)
𝑏(𝑣)2 > 0 irrespective of the 
firm’s choice of the evidentiary threshold function as long as 𝑛(𝑣�) > 0.   
Proposition 4: The lobbying mechanism can only improve expected profit over price 
delegation if evidence of low demand is harder to obtain in higher demand states: 
𝑏′(𝑣) < 0. 
Proof: We prove this result by contradiction.  Suppose 𝑏′(𝑣) ≥ 0 such that 𝜕𝑙(𝑣� ,𝑣)
𝜕𝑣
≤ 0.  
Given (5) and (6), we have 𝑆′(𝑣) > 0.  Thus the IR constraint is binding in equilibrium for 
the lowest demand state: 𝑆�𝑣� = 0.  We can then rewrite the sales rep’s surplus as 
 𝑆(𝑣) = 𝑆�𝑣� + ∫ 𝑆ʹ(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 = ∫ (−𝜀𝑥ʹ − 𝑙𝑥ʹ )𝑑𝑥𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣  
where 𝜀𝑥ʹ = 𝜕𝜀[𝑝(𝑣�),𝑥]𝜕𝑥  |𝑣�=𝑥 and 𝑙𝑥ʹ = 𝜕𝑙(𝑣� ,𝑥)𝜕𝑥   |𝑣�=𝑥 for notational convenience.  Substituting 
in the sales rep’s surplus function, the firm’s expected profit becomes 
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 𝔼𝜋𝐺 = ∫ {𝑝(𝑣) − 𝑆(𝑣) − 𝜀[𝑝(𝑣),𝑣] − 𝑙(𝑣, 𝑣)} 𝑑𝐹(𝑣)𝑣𝑣  
The above transformation simplifies the firm’s objective function by eliminating 𝑤(𝑣).  
However, ∫ 𝑆(𝑣)𝑑𝐹(𝑣)𝑣𝑣  still involves double integrals.  For further simplification, we 
use “integrating by parts” and obtain 
 ∫ 𝑆(𝑣)𝑑𝐹(𝑣)𝑣𝑣 = ∫ ∫ (−𝜀𝑥ʹ − 𝑙𝑥ʹ )𝑑𝑥𝑣𝑣 𝑑𝐹(𝑣)𝑣𝑣  
 = ∫ (−𝜀𝑥ʹ − 𝑙𝑥ʹ )𝑑𝑥𝑣𝑣 𝐹(𝑣)  |𝑣𝑣 − ∫ 𝐹(𝑣)𝑣𝑣 (−𝜀𝑣ʹ − 𝑙𝑣ʹ )𝑑𝑣 
 = ∫ (−𝜀𝑥ʹ − 𝑙𝑥ʹ )𝑑𝑥𝑣𝑣 − ∫ 𝐹(𝑣)𝑣𝑣 (−𝜀𝑣ʹ − 𝑙𝑣ʹ )𝑑𝑣 
 = ∫ (−𝜀𝑣ʹ − 𝑙𝑣ʹ )[1 − 𝐹(𝑣)]𝑑𝑣𝑣𝑣  
Combining terms yields 
 𝔼𝜋𝐺 = ∫ {𝑝(𝑣) − 𝜀[𝑝(𝑣), 𝑣] − 𝑙(𝑣, 𝑣)}𝑑𝐹(𝑣) − ∫ (−𝜀𝑣ʹ − 𝑙𝑣ʹ )[1 − 𝐹(𝑣)]𝑣𝑣 𝑑𝑣𝑣𝑣  
 = ∫ ({𝑝(𝑣) − 𝜀[𝑝(𝑣), 𝑣]}𝑓(𝑣) + 𝜀𝑣ʹ [1 − 𝐹(𝑣)])𝑑𝑣 + 𝑌𝑣𝑣  
where 𝑌 = −∫ 𝑙(𝑣, 𝑣)𝑓(𝑣)𝑑𝑣𝑣𝑣 + ∫ 𝑙𝑣′ [1 − 𝐹(𝑣)]𝑑𝑣𝑣𝑣 .  Since 𝑙𝑣ʹ ≤ 0, we have 𝑌 ≤ 0.  It 
follows that  
 𝔼𝜋𝐺 ≤ ∫ ({𝑝(𝑣) − 𝜀[𝑝(𝑣),𝑣]}𝑓(𝑣) + 𝜀𝑣ʹ [1 − 𝐹(𝑣)])𝑑𝑣𝑣𝑣  
But the right-hand side of the above inequality is the expected profit under price 
delegation given the induced price scheme 𝑝(𝑣).  (We can derive the expected profit 
under price delegation by repeating the above analysis and omitting all terms associated 
with lobbying cost.)  This expected profit, in turn, is weakly lower than the optimal 
expected profit under price delegation by definition.  Therefore, we have established a 
contradiction.  Q.E.D. 
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This result states that the necessary condition for lobbying to improve expected profit beyond 
price delegation is that lobbying is more costly when demand is high than when demand is low, 
other things being equal.  This is a general result that does not depend upon the particular 
evidentiary process that we have modeled; it simply requires that 𝜕𝑙(𝑣� ,𝑣)
𝜕𝑣
> 0.   
We conclude this section by deriving the optimal lobbying mechanism.  First we prove in the 
Technical Appendix that the sales rep’s IR constraint must be binding in the lowest demand 
state: 𝑆�𝑣� = 0.  Intuitively, the sales rep enjoys no information rent when demand is 𝑣.  A 
positive surplus 𝑆�𝑣� can thus only come from the lobbying mechanism, and the firm has the 
incentive to adjust 𝑛(𝑣) to extract this surplus.   
Given that 𝑆�𝑣� = 0, we can derive the firm’s expected profit 𝔼𝜋𝐺  following the same analysis 
presented in the proof of Proposition 4.  Rearranging terms yields 𝔼𝜋𝐺 = ∫ 𝑦(𝑣)𝑑𝑣𝑣𝑣  where 
 𝑦(𝑣) = {𝑝(𝑣) − 𝜀[𝑝(𝑣), 𝑣] − 𝑙(𝑣, 𝑣)}𝑓(𝑣) + (𝜀𝑣ʹ + 𝑙𝑣ʹ )[1 − 𝐹(𝑣)] 
 = �𝑝(𝑣) − 𝜀[𝑝(𝑣), 𝑣] − 𝑐 𝑛(𝑣)
𝑏(𝑣)� 𝑓(𝑣) + �𝜀𝑣ʹ − 𝑐 𝑛(𝑣)𝑏′(𝑣)𝑏(𝑣)2 � [1 − 𝐹(𝑣)] 
The firm’s optimization problem amounts to choosing 𝑝(𝑣) and 𝑛(𝑣) to maximize 𝑦(𝑣) for each 
𝑣.  Taking derivatives yields 
 𝑑𝑦(𝑣)
𝑑𝑝(𝑣) = �1 − 𝜀𝑝′ [𝑝(𝑣), 𝑣]�𝑓(𝑣) + 𝜀𝑝𝑣ʹʹ [1 − 𝐹(𝑣)] 
 𝑑𝑦(𝑣)
𝑑𝑛(𝑣) = −𝑐 1𝑏(𝑣) 𝑓(𝑣) − 𝑐 𝑏′(𝑣)𝑏(𝑣)2 [1 − 𝐹(𝑣)] = 𝑐[1−𝐹(𝑣)]𝑏(𝑣) �− 𝑓(𝑣)1−𝐹(𝑣) − 𝑏′(𝑣)𝑏(𝑣) � 
The firm’s optimal price scheme 𝑝(𝑣) can be derived from the first derivative.  Notice also that 
the second derivative does not depend upon 𝑛 and the scalar 𝑐[1−𝐹(𝑣)]
𝑏(𝑣)  is always nonnegative.  
Therefore, the firm should require evidence (i.e. set 𝑛(𝑣) > 0) to approve price 𝑝(𝑣) iff:  
(7) −𝑏
′(𝑣)
𝑏(𝑣) ≥ 𝑓(𝑣)1−𝐹(𝑣) 
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Specifically, if Condition (7) holds the firm will increase 𝑛(𝑣) until the IR constraint is just 
binding for the sales rep in demand state 𝑣.  (Recall that the sales rep’s IC constraint is satisfied 
by the envelope theorem.)  In the Technical Appendix we illustrate how to calculate the optimal 
𝑛(𝑣) for explicit functions of 𝑓(𝑣), 𝑏(𝑣) and 𝜀(𝑝, 𝑣).  If Condition (7) does not hold the firm 
should not require any evidence before approving the price 𝑝(𝑣). 
The interpretation of Condition (7) again reflects the intuition of the main model.  The firm 
should require evidence before approving price 𝑝(𝑣) in the following situations.  First, it is 
relatively much harder to produce evidence of low demand as demand increases (larger −𝑏
′(𝑣)
𝑏(𝑣) ).  
Second, the focal demand condition 𝑣 is less likely to occur (smaller 𝑓(𝑣)), so that the firm 
expects to incur the corresponding lobbying cost with a lower probability.  Third, there is a 
greater probability that demand is higher than 𝑣 (larger values of 1 − 𝐹(𝑣)).  This increases the 
expected importance of recapturing the information rents in these higher demand states.  In 
contrast, Condition (7) never holds in the highest demand state 𝑣 as long as 𝑏′(𝑣) is bounded.  
This result is again intuitive; the firm should waive evidentiary requirements if the sales rep 
volunteers to report that demand is at its highest level.   
Summary 
We illustrate how to extend the model to multiple demand states using a continuous-state 
model.  The results generalize the intuition of the main model.  Recall that in the two-state 
model lobbying only operates as an effective screening mechanism if it is harder in the higher 
demand state to produce evidence that demand is low.  The same condition is also a necessary 
condition in the continuous-state model.  In the continuous-state model the conditions under 
which the firm will require evidence again reflect the trade-off between extracting information 
rents from the sales rep in the high demand states and the cost of reimbursing the sales rep for 
the burden of lobbying.   
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§ 6. Conclusions 
We began this paper by illustrating how price delegation can help the firm harness the sales 
force’s private information about demand.  To ensure that prices increase when demand is 
high, the firm must pay information rents to the sales force.  The focus of the paper is on 
exploring what internal mechanisms the firm can use to reduce these rents. The key finding is 
that lobbying serves this role.  We model the requirement to lobby for low prices as a 
requirement to present evidence that demand is really low.  The profitability of this mechanism 
depends upon how easily the sales force can acquire this evidence in different demand states.  
If the evidence is a lot easier to produce in the low demand state than in the high demand 
state, then lobbying is a more efficient mechanism.   
The findings are robust to a broad range of extensions.  Although these extensions may initially 
appear to make the lobbying mechanism more costly, many of them actually strengthen the 
mechanism by making it more efficient.  For example, we might expect that risk aversion would 
make lobbying more costly as it exposes the sales force to uncertainty in the process of 
collecting evidence.  The firm indirectly incurs this cost as it must reimburse the sales force for 
this uncertainty when demand is low. However, risk aversion can also make lobbying more 
profitable by making it less appealing when demand is high.  
We also demonstrate that the key findings in the paper extend to a continuous-demand model 
in which the firm uses a continuous evidence threshold to distinguish between the different 
demand states.  When setting this evidentiary threshold the firm faces the same trade-offs in 
the continuous model as in the main model with discrete demand states.  Increasing the 
evidence requirement makes it less attractive to understate demand in high demand states, but 
the firm must reimburse the sales force for the cost of producing evidence when demand is 
low.  In both of the models, a necessary condition for lobbying to be profitable is that the firm 
can identify sources of evidence that are more accessible to the sales force when demand is 
truly low. 
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Throughout the paper we assume that the sales rep knows the state of demand.  The search for 
evidence is socially wasteful as it does not bring any new information into the system.  Future 
research might consider markets in which the sales rep’s prior information about demand is 
imperfect, but he can update his information by collecting demand signals.  This possibility may 
yield interesting effects.  On the one hand, the sales rep’s private information is of worse 
quality, which reduces the firm’s incentive to elicit this information through a costly evidentiary 
process.  On the other hand, the sales rep now has a private incentive to acquire more 
information, which means the firm might not need to fully reimburse these costs.  It would be 
interesting to investigate these effects in future research.  
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Appendix 
Survey Findings 
A sample of 99 managers attending “Strategic Marketing” Executive Education programs at a 
major university were asked whether they agreed with the following statement about their 
organizations: 
“Managers are often concerned that sales people want to charge prices that are too low.” 
Responses were recorded using a 7-point Likert scale, anchored by “strongly agree” and 
“strongly disagree”.  The responses are summarized in the figure below. 
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Lobbying (Main Model of Section 3) 
Result 1: Suppose the lobbying mechanism requires that the sales rep provide one signal of low 
demand to obtain a price discount.  The firm’s expected profit can increase with the sales rep’s 
cost of search 𝑐. 
Proof of Result 1: First define 𝑐∗ = 𝑒𝐿
𝑔(𝑟).  If 𝑐 ≥ 𝑐∗, then 𝔼𝜋𝐸1 = 𝔼𝜋∗ − (1 − 𝑢)𝑐/𝑟, so that 
𝑑𝔼𝜋𝐸1
𝑑𝑐
< 0.  If 𝑐 < 𝑐∗, then 𝔼𝜋𝐸1 = 𝔼𝜋∗ − 𝑢[𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐𝑔(𝑟)] − (1 − 𝑢)𝑐/𝑟, so that 𝑑𝔼𝜋𝐸1𝑑𝑐 =
𝑟(1+𝑢)−1
𝑟(1−𝑟) , which is positive if 𝑟 > 11+𝑢 and negative otherwise.   Q.E.D. 
 
Result 2:  Suppose the lobbying mechanism requires that the sales rep provide one signal of low 
demand to obtain a price discount.  If evidence is sufficiently accurate (𝑟 > 1
1+𝑢
) then the firm 
should choose the lobbying mechanism over price delegation.  If the firm has control over the 
sales rep’s search cost, it should impose a positive search cost of 𝑐∗ = 𝑒𝐿
𝑔(𝑟). 
Proof Result 2: Since 𝔼𝜋𝐸1 decreases with 𝑐 over (𝑐∗,∞) for all values of 𝑟, the optimal 𝑐 must 
fall within (0, 𝑐∗].  Given Condition (4), the firm prefers lobbying over price delegation iff 
 𝑢 𝑒𝐿 min �1, 𝑐𝑐∗� > (1 − 𝑢) 𝑐𝑟  
Since 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐∗ in equilibrium, Condition (4) becomes 
 𝑢 𝑒𝐿
𝑐∗
> (1 − 𝑢) 1
𝑟
 
Rearranging terms, the above condition is equivalent to 
 𝑟 > 1
1+𝑢
 
However, from the proof of Result 1 we know that 𝔼𝜋𝐸1 increases with 𝑐 over (0, 𝑐∗] when 
𝑟 > 1
1+𝑢
.  Therefore, the optimal 𝑐 equals 𝑐∗.   Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: It is easy to show that the IC constraints are binding in equilibrium and 
the IR constraint holds with slack.  Hence the optimal commissions are 
 𝑤𝐿 = 𝑒𝐿 + 𝑐𝑛/𝑟 
 𝑤𝐻 = 𝑒𝐻 + max[0,𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛/(1 − 𝑟)] 
Given these optimal commissions, the firm’s optimization problem is reduced to 
 max𝑛≥0   𝔼𝜋𝐸 = 𝔼𝜋∗ − 𝑢max[0, 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑔(𝑟)𝑐𝑛] − (1 − 𝑢)𝑐𝑛/𝑟   
Deriving 𝑛∗ from 𝑒𝐿 = 𝑔(𝑟)𝑐𝑛, we obtain 
 𝑛∗ = 𝑒𝐿
𝑔(𝑟)𝑐 
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If 𝑛 ≥ 𝑛∗, then 𝔼𝜋𝐸 = 𝔼𝜋∗ − (1 − 𝑢)𝑐𝑛/𝑟, which decreases with 𝑛.  Therefore, the optimal 𝑛 
must fall within [0,𝑛∗].  The firm’s optimization problem becomes 
 max𝑛∈[0,𝑛∗]   𝔼𝜋𝐸 = 𝔼𝜋∗ − 𝑢[𝑒𝐿 − 𝑔(𝑟)𝑐𝑛] − (1 − 𝑢)𝑐𝑛/𝑟  
It follows that 
 𝑑𝔼𝜋𝐸
𝑑𝑛
= 𝑢𝑐𝑔(𝑟) − (1 − 𝑢)𝑐/𝑟 
which is positive iff 𝑟 > 1
1+𝑢
. 
Therefore, the firm should set 𝑛 = 𝑛∗ if 𝑟 > 1
1+𝑢
 and set 𝑛 = 0 (i.e., using price delegation) 
otherwise.   Q.E.D. 
 
 
When Lobbying Constrains Selling 
In this section we examine the case in which selling and lobbying are competing activities.  First, 
we further parameterize the model setup to capture the “bounded” nature of selling effort.  
We assume that the sales rep can choose his level of selling effort 𝑠 ∈ [0, 1].  If demand is high, 
the customer will pay 𝑣𝐻 with probability 𝑠 and pay 𝑣𝐿 with probability 1 − 𝑠.  If demand is low, 
the customer will pay 𝑣𝐿 with probability 𝑠 and pay 0 with probability 1 − 𝑠.  The sales rep’s 
marginal cost of selling effort is 𝑒𝐻 if demand is high and is 𝑒𝐿 is demand is low.  It is easy to 
verify that this alternative specification does not change the results of the main model 
presented in Section 3.  In particular, given Conditions (1) and (2), the firm will induce the sales 
rep to incur full selling effort (𝑠 = 1) in equilibrium. 
Next we introduce lobbying effort that constrains selling.  We assume that the sales rep’s total 
selling and lobbying effort cannot exceed 1.  Following the same argument of the main model, 
in equilibrium the firm will want the sales rep to lobby if and only if demand is low; it will 
charge a price of 𝑣𝐿 if the sales rep lobbies, and 𝑣𝐻 otherwise.  The firm will pay the sales rep a 
commission of 𝑤𝐿 if he sells at price 𝑣𝐿, and a commission of 𝑤𝐻 if he sells at price 𝑣𝐻.  The firm 
pays zero if the sales rep fails to sell.  To approve the price 𝑣𝐿 the firm requires that the sales 
rep provide 𝑛 signals of low demand.  Below we derive the optimal commissions 𝑤𝐿 and 𝑤𝐻 
and the optimal evidentiary threshold 𝑛. 
When demand is low, the sales rep earns a surplus of zero if he does not lobby.  He earns a 
surplus of (𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿)𝑠 − 𝑐𝑛/𝑟 if he lobbies and exerts selling effort 𝑠, which cannot exceed 1 − 𝑐𝑛/𝑟.  For this sales rep to be willing to exert selling effort, the firm must ensure that 
𝑤𝐿 ≥ 𝑒𝐿.  The sales rep will in turn put in the maximum available selling effort of 𝑠 = 1 − 𝑐𝑛/𝑟, 
and will earn a surplus of (𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿)(1 − 𝑐𝑛/𝑟) − 𝑐𝑛/𝑟.  Therefore, to induce the sales rep in 
the low demand state to lobby and exert selling effort, the firm needs to offer a commission 
equal to 
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 𝑤𝐿 = 𝑒𝐿 + 𝑐𝑛/(𝑟 − 𝑐𝑛) 
When demand is high, by lobbying, the sales rep can sell without effort and thus earns a surplus 
of 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛/(1 − 𝑟).  By not lobbying, the sales rep earns a surplus of (𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻)𝑠 if he exerts 
selling effort 𝑠.  To induce selling effort, the firm must offer 𝑤𝐻 ≥ 𝑒𝐻.  The sales rep’s highest-
possible surplus from not lobbying is thus 𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻, whereby he maximizes his selling effort as 
𝑠 = 1.  Therefore, to induce the sales rep to work and not to lobby when demand is high, the 
firm must offer   
 𝑤𝐻 = 𝑒𝐻 + max[0, 𝑒𝐿 + 𝑐𝑛/(𝑟 − 𝑐𝑛) − 𝑐𝑛/(1 − 𝑟)] 
By enforcing a lobbying process when lobbying constrains selling (denoted as “𝐶”), the firm 
earns an expected profit of 
 𝔼𝜋𝐶 = 𝑢(𝑣𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻 − max[0, 𝑒𝐿 + 𝑐𝑛/(𝑟 − 𝑐𝑛) − 𝑐𝑛/(1 − 𝑟)]) 
  +(1 − 𝑢)[(1 − 𝑐𝑛/𝑟)(𝑣𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿) − 𝑐𝑛/𝑟] 
Let 𝑛𝐶∗  denote the value of 𝑛 that solves 0 = 𝑒𝐿 + 𝑐𝑛/(𝑟 − 𝑐𝑛) − 𝑐𝑛/(1 − 𝑟).  That is, by 
requiring 𝑛𝐶∗  low signals before cutting prices, the firm is just able to reduce the high-demand 
sales rep’s information rent to zero.   
If 𝑛 ≥ 𝑛𝐶∗ , then  
 𝔼𝜋𝐶 = 𝑢(𝑣𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻) + (1 − 𝑢)[(1 − 𝑐𝑛/𝑟)(𝑣𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿) − 𝑐𝑛/𝑟] 
where 𝔼𝜋𝐶  decreases with 𝑛.  Therefore, the optimal 𝑛 must fall within [0,𝑛𝐶∗ ].  It follows that 
𝑤𝐻 = 𝑒𝐻 + 𝑒𝐿 + 𝑐𝑛/(𝑟 − 𝑐𝑛) − 𝑐𝑛/(1 − 𝑟).  The firm’s expected profit becomes 
 𝔼𝜋𝐶 = 𝑢(𝑣𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛/(𝑟 − 𝑐𝑛) + 𝑐𝑛/(1 − 𝑟)]) 
  +(1 − 𝑢)[(1 − 𝑐𝑛/𝑟)(𝑣𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿) − 𝑐𝑛/𝑟] 
It can be shown that 𝑑2𝔼𝜋𝐶/𝑑𝑛2 < 0,  so that 𝔼𝜋𝐶  is concave in 𝑛 over [0,𝑛𝐶∗ ]. 
Next, we compare 𝑛𝐶∗  with 𝑛∗, where 𝑛∗ is the optimal number of low demand signals required 
when lobbying does not constrain selling.  From the proof of Proposition 1, we know that 𝑛∗ 
solves 0 = 𝑒𝐿 + 𝑐𝑛/𝑟 − 𝑐𝑛/(1 − 𝑟).  The right-hand side of the equation decreases with 𝑛 and 
is negative when 𝑛 = 𝑛𝐶∗ .  Therefore, 𝑛∗ < 𝑛𝐶∗ . 
Finally, it can be shown that there exist parameter values that satisfy the following conditions.  
First, 𝑑𝔼𝜋𝐶/𝑑𝑛 > 0 when 𝑛 = 𝑛∗.  Second, lobbying costs are such that 𝑐𝑛∗/𝑟 < 1 and 
𝑐𝑛∗/(1 − 𝑟) < 1, which satisfies the normalization assumption that the sum of selling and 
lobbying cost cannot exceed 1.  Third, 𝔼𝜋𝐶∗ > 𝔼𝜋𝑃∗  such that the firm prefers lobbying over price 
delegation, where 𝔼𝜋𝐶∗  equals 𝔼𝜋𝐶  evaluated at 𝑛 = 𝑛𝐶∗ .  Figure 1 in the paper presents one 
such example. 
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When the Sales Rep is Risk Averse 
To capture risk aversion, let 𝑈(𝑥) denote the utility that the sales rep derives from his net 
payoff 𝑥, which equals the commission he earns net of any cost of selling and cost of lobbying.  
The utility function 𝑈(𝑥) exhibits the usual properties of risk aversion: 𝑈′′ < 0, 𝑈′ > 0, and 
𝑈(0) = 0.  The firm is risk neutral, following the convention in the literature (e.g., Lal 1986).  
We continue to assume that the firm intends to tailor prices to demand (as opposed to 
mandating a high price).  The firm’s optimization problem (“𝑅” for risk aversion) is as follows. 
 max𝑤𝐻,𝑤𝐿,𝑛   𝔼𝜋𝑅 = 𝑢(𝑣𝐻 − 𝑤𝐻) + (1 − 𝑢)(𝑣𝐿 − 𝑤𝐿) 
s.t. 𝑈(𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻) ≥ max�0,𝔼𝑧𝐻𝑈�𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐(𝑛 + 𝑧𝐻)��   (ICH
 𝔼𝑧𝐿𝑈�𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐(𝑛 + 𝑧𝐿)� ≥ 0     (IC ) L
 𝑢𝑈(𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻) + (1 − 𝑢)𝔼𝑧𝐿𝑈�𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐(𝑛 + 𝑧𝐿)� ≥ 0  (IR) )  
 𝑤𝐻,𝑤𝐿 ≥ 0         (Limited Liability) 
 𝑛 ≥ 0 
The constraints of the optimization problem are interpreted as follows.  The ICH
Similarly, the IC
 constraint 
ensures that the sales rep will exert selling effort and will not lobby when demand is high.  In 
doing so, the sales rep earns a utility of 𝑈(𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻).  Alternatively, if the sales rep shirks selling 
effort and does not lobby, he will earn a utility of  𝑈(0) = 0.  If the sales rep lobbies, he can sell 
without selling effort but will have to provide 𝑛 signals of low demand.  We use 𝑧𝐻 to denote 
the number of unsuccessful draws needed before the sales rep is able to collect 𝑛 signals of low 
demand when demand is actually high.  𝑧𝐻 follows the negative binomial distribution with 
parameters (𝑛, 1 − 𝑟).  The sales rep’s total search cost is 𝑐(𝑛 + 𝑧𝐻).  His expected deviation 
utility, computed over the distribution of 𝑧𝐻, is 𝔼𝑧𝐻𝑈�𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐(𝑛 + 𝑧𝐻)�. 
L
The IR constraint ensures that the sales rep is willing to accept the firm’s contract offer.  His ex 
ante expected utility, before knowing the realized demand state, must be greater than or equal 
to his outside option 0.  Note that the sales rep’s ex post participation constraint is trivially 
satisfied because he is guaranteed a minimum wage of zero. 
 constraint ensures that the sales rep will exert selling effort and will lobby 
when demand is low.  In doing so, the sales rep earns an expected utility of 𝔼𝑧𝐿𝑈�𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 −
𝑐𝑛+𝑧𝐿.  Here 𝑧𝐿 denotes the number of unsuccessful draws needed before the sales rep is able 
to collect 𝑛 signals of low demand when demand is indeed low.  𝑧𝐿 follows the negative 
binomial distribution with parameters (𝑛, 𝑟).  Alternatively, if the sales rep deviates by either 
shirking selling effort or not lobbying, he will earn a utility of at most 0. 
Finally, note that the above incentive structure subsumes both price delegation and lobbying.  
The firm chooses 𝑛 ≥ 0, the number of low demand signals to require before approving the low 
price, to maximize its expected profit 𝔼𝜋𝑅.  If the optimal 𝑛 equals 0, the optimal contract is 
price delegation.  If the optimal 𝑛 is positive, the optimal contract is lobbying. 
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The set of constraints can be simplified.  First, note that the IR and Limited Liability constraints 
are both redundant given ICH and ICL.  Second, ICH and ICL
How does risk aversion affect the optimal contract?  Before solving the optimization problem, 
we comment on a number of interesting observations.  First, from the binding IC
 must bind in equilibrium, otherwise 
the firm can decrease 𝑤𝐻 or 𝑤𝐿, respectively, by a small amount and increase expected profit 
without violating any constraint.   
L
 𝔼𝑧𝐿𝑈�𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐(𝑛 + 𝑧𝐿)� = 0 < 𝑈�𝔼𝑧𝐿[𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐(𝑛 + 𝑧𝐿)]� 
 constraint 
and Jensen’s inequality we have 
whereas 𝔼𝑧𝐿[𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐(𝑛 + 𝑧𝐿)] = 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛/𝑟.  It follows that, with risk aversion, the 
optimal commission 𝑤𝐿 more than covers the sales rep’s selling effort and expected lobbying 
cost in the low demand state: 
 𝑤𝐿 > 𝑒𝐿 + 𝑐𝑛/𝑟 
However, with risk aversion, a lower evidentiary requirement also suffices to extract the sales 
rep’s information rent (𝑤𝐿) in the high demand state.  To see this, we again apply Jensen’s 
inequality and obtain  
 𝔼𝑧𝐻𝑈�𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐(𝑛 + 𝑧𝐻)� < 𝑈�𝔼𝑧𝐻[𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐(𝑛 + 𝑧𝐻)]�   
where 𝔼𝑧𝐻[𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐(𝑛 + 𝑧𝐻)] = 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛/(1 − 𝑟).  Let 𝑛𝑅∗  denote the value of 𝑛 that solves 
𝔼𝑧𝐻𝑈�𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐(𝑛 + 𝑧𝐻)� = 0.  We have 
 𝑐𝑛𝑅∗ /(1 − 𝑟) < 𝑤𝐿 
In summary, the sales rep needs extra incentive to be willing to lobby in both demand states 
because of risk aversion.  The net effect on the efficacy of lobbying is ambiguous.  For 
concreteness, below we impose further functional form assumptions on the sales rep’s utility.  
We assume that the sales rep has exponential utility: 
(R1) 𝑈(𝑥) = 1 − 𝑒−𝛼𝑥 
where 𝛼 > 0 is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.  A larger 𝛼 means that the sales rep is 
more risk averse.   
We want to derive the optimal contract in closed form.  To do so, first we express the optimal 
commission 𝑤𝐿 as a function of 𝑛.  Let 𝐶𝐸[𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐(𝑛 + 𝑧𝐿)] denote the certainty 
equivalent of the net payoff 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐(𝑛 + 𝑧𝐿) through the exponential utility function, such 
that 
 𝔼𝑧𝐿𝑈�𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐(𝑛 + 𝑧𝐿)� = 𝑈(𝐶𝐸[𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐(𝑛 + 𝑧𝐿)]) 
It follows from Equation (R1) that 
 𝔼𝑧𝐿𝑈�𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐(𝑛 + 𝑧𝐿)� = 𝔼𝑧𝐿�1 − 𝑒−𝛼[𝑤𝐿−𝑒𝐿−𝑐(𝑛+𝑧𝐿)]� 
 = 1 − 𝑒−𝛼(𝑤𝐿−𝑒𝐿−𝑐𝑛)𝔼𝑧𝐿𝑒𝛼𝑐𝑧𝐿 
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Since 𝑧𝐿 follows the negative binomial distribution with parameters (𝑛, 𝑟), we have 
 𝔼𝑧𝐿𝑒
𝛼𝑐𝑧𝐿 = ∑ �𝑧𝐿 + 𝑛 − 1𝑧𝐿 �∞𝑧𝐿=0 (1 − 𝑟)𝑧𝐿  𝑟𝑛 𝑒𝛼𝑐𝑧𝐿  
 = ∑ �𝑧𝐿 + 𝑛 − 1𝑧𝐿 �∞𝑧𝐿=0 [(1 − 𝑟)𝑒𝛼𝑐]𝑧𝐿  𝑟𝑛 
 = 𝑟𝑛[1−(1−𝑟)𝑒𝛼𝑐]𝑛  ∑ �𝑧𝐿 + 𝑛 − 1𝑧𝐿 �∞𝑧𝐿=0 [(1 − 𝑟)𝑒𝛼𝑐]𝑧𝐿  [1 − (1 − 𝑟)𝑒𝛼𝑐]𝑛 
But �
𝑧𝐿 + 𝑛 − 1
𝑧𝐿
� [(1 − 𝑟)𝑒𝛼𝑐]𝑧𝐿  [1 − (1 − 𝑟)𝑒𝛼𝑐]𝑛 is the p.m.f. of the negative binomial 
distribution with parameters (𝑛, 1 − (1 − 𝑟)𝑒𝛼𝑐).1
 𝔼𝑧𝐿𝑒
𝛼𝑐𝑧𝐿 = 𝑟𝑛[1−(1−𝑟)𝑒𝛼𝑐]𝑛   Therefore 
Substituting terms yields 
 𝔼𝑧𝐿𝑈�𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐(𝑛 + 𝑧𝐿)� = 1 − 𝑒−𝛼(𝑤𝐿−𝑒𝐿−𝑐𝑛) 𝑟𝑛[1−(1−𝑟)𝑒𝛼𝑐]𝑛 
 = 1 − 𝑒−𝛼�𝑤𝐿−𝑒𝐿−𝑐𝑛−𝑛𝛼 ln 𝑟1−(1−𝑟)𝑒𝛼𝑐�  
Therefore, by definition of the certainty equivalent, we have 
 𝐶𝐸[𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐(𝑛 + 𝑧𝐿)] = 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛 − 𝑛𝛼 ln 𝑟1−(1−𝑟)𝑒𝛼𝑐 
In addition, the fact that ICL
(R2) 𝑤𝐿 = 𝑒𝐿 + 𝑐𝑛 𝑚(𝛼, 𝑟)  
 is binding means that 𝐶𝐸[𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐(𝑛 + 𝑧𝐿)] = 0.  Combining 
terms yields 
where 𝑚(𝛼, 𝑟) = 1 + 1
𝛼𝑐
ln 𝑟
1−(1−𝑟)𝑒𝛼𝑐. 
It is easy to verify that the “multiplier” term 𝑚(𝛼, 𝑟) > 0.  Therefore, 𝜕𝑤𝐿
𝜕𝑛
> 0.  The firm must 
promise a higher commission for the low demand state to compensate the sales rep for 
meeting a higher evidentiary requirement. 
Next we want to rewrite the optimal commission 𝑤𝐻 as a function of 𝑛.  Following the same 
strategy of the above analysis, we obtain 
 𝐶𝐸[𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐(𝑛 + 𝑧𝐻)] = 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛 �1 + 1𝛼𝑐 ln 1−𝑟1−𝑟𝑒𝛼𝑐� 
The binding ICH
 𝑈(𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻) = max �0,𝑈 �𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛 �1 + 1𝛼𝑐 ln 1−𝑟1−𝑟𝑒𝛼𝑐���  constraint thus becomes 
                                                          
1 We assume that (1 − 𝑟)𝑒𝛼𝑐 < 1.  Subsequently, we also assume 𝑟𝑒𝛼𝑐 < 1 in order to evoke the same derivation 
strategy.  We maintain both assumptions for the rest of this section because the purpose of the analysis is to prove 
existence.  
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Let 𝑛𝑅∗  denote the value of 𝑛 that solves 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛 �1 + 1𝛼𝑐 ln 1−𝑟1−𝑟𝑒𝛼𝑐� = 0.  Rearranging terms we 
obtain 
 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛 �1 + 1𝛼𝑐 ln 1−𝑟1−𝑟𝑒𝛼𝑐� = 𝑒𝐿 + 𝑐𝑛 �1 + 1𝛼𝑐 ln 𝑟1−(1−𝑟)𝑒𝛼𝑐� − 𝑐𝑛 �1 + 1𝛼𝑐 ln 1−𝑟1−𝑟𝑒𝛼𝑐� 
 = 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑛 1𝛼 ln (1−𝑟)[1−(1−𝑟)𝑒𝛼𝑐]𝑟(1−𝑟𝑒𝛼𝑐)  
We define the following notation 
(R3) ℎ(𝛼, 𝑟) = 1
𝛼𝑐
ln (1−𝑟)[1−(1−𝑟)𝑒𝛼𝑐]
𝑟(1−𝑟𝑒𝛼𝑐)  
The ℎ(𝛼, 𝑟) term is the counterpart of 𝑔(𝑟) of the main model – both terms measure the 
relative disutility of collecting a low demand signal when demand is high as opposed to low.  
Because 𝑟 ∈ (1/2, 1) and 𝛼 > 0, it can be verified that ℎ(𝛼, 𝑟) > 0.  In other words, gathering a 
low demand signal generates greater disutility when demand is high than when demand is low.  
Therefore, a higher evidentiary threshold improves the screening power of the lobbying 
mechanism.  The firm will be able to extract the sales rep’s entire rent in the high demand state 
when the evidentiary threshold reaches 
(R4) 𝑛𝑅∗ = 𝑒𝐿ℎ(𝛼,𝑟)𝑐 
In equilibrium, 𝑛 must be less than or equal to 𝑛𝑅∗ , otherwise the firm can always decrease 𝑛 by 
a small amount, decrease 𝑤𝐿, and improve expected profit.  It follows that 
 𝑈(𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻) = 𝑈 �𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛 �1 + 1𝛼𝑐 ln 1−𝑟1−𝑟𝑒𝛼𝑐�� 
which in turn implies that 
(R5) 𝑤𝐻 = 𝑒𝐻 + 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛 �1 + 1𝛼𝑐 ln 1−𝑟1−𝑟𝑒𝛼𝑐� = 𝑒𝐻 + 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑛𝑐 ℎ(𝛼, 𝑟) 
So far we have rewritten optimal commissions as functions of 𝑛.  It remains to maximize the 
firm’s expected profit with respect to 𝑛.  To use the first-order condition, note that 
 𝑑𝔼𝜋𝑅
𝑑𝑛
= −𝑢 𝑑𝑤𝐻
𝑑𝑛
− (1 − 𝑢) 𝑑𝑤𝐿
𝑑𝑛
= 𝑐[𝑢 ℎ(𝛼, 𝑟) − (1 − 𝑢) 𝑚(𝛼, 𝑟)] 
For any given value of 𝛼, there exist parameter values for 𝑑𝔼𝜋𝑅
𝑑𝑛
 to be positive.  For example, 
when 𝑢 is sufficiently high, 𝑑𝔼𝜋𝑅
𝑑𝑛
> 0 because ℎ(𝛼, 𝑟) > 0.  Therefore, for any degree of risk 
aversion, there exist parameter values under which the firm prefers the lobbying mechanism 
over price delegation. 
Finally, having derived the optimal contract in closed form, it is straightforward to verify that 
𝜕𝑚(𝛼,𝑟)
𝜕𝛼
> 0, 𝜕ℎ(𝛼,𝑟)
𝜕𝛼
> 0, 𝜕𝑛𝑅∗
𝜕𝛼
< 0, and 𝜕𝔼𝜋𝑅∗
𝜕𝛼
> 0, where 𝔼𝜋𝑅∗  is the firm’s expected profit when 
setting its evidentiary requirement to 𝑛𝑅∗ .   
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When the Firm Can Acquire Evidence on Its Own 
Deriving the Optimal Verification Mechanism 
The firm’s optimization problem is 
 max
𝑛,𝑘  𝔼𝜋𝑉 = 𝔼𝜋∗ − 𝑢𝜙𝐻(𝑛,𝑘)𝑒𝐿 − (1 − 𝑢)[1 − 𝜙𝐿(𝑛, 𝑘)](𝑣𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿) − (1 − 𝑢)𝑐𝑘 
 s.t. 𝑛 ≥ 0,𝑛 ≤ 𝑘 
  𝑘 ≥ 0 
Taking partial derivatives with respect to 𝑛 yields2
 𝜕𝔼𝜋𝑉
𝜕𝑛
= −𝑢𝑒𝐿 𝜕𝜙𝐻(𝑛,𝑘)𝜕𝑛 + (1 − 𝑢)(𝑣𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿) 𝜕𝜙𝐿(𝑛,𝑘)𝜕𝑛   
where 
 𝜕𝜙𝐻(𝑛,𝑘)
𝜕𝑛
= −�𝑘𝑛�𝑟𝑘−𝑛(1 − 𝑟)𝑛 
 𝜕𝜙𝐿(𝑛,𝑘)
𝜕𝑛
= −�𝑘𝑛�𝑟𝑛(1 − 𝑟)𝑘−𝑛 
Note that 𝜕𝜙𝐻(𝑛,𝑘)
𝜕𝑛
< 0 and 𝜕𝜙𝐿(𝑛,𝑘)
𝜕𝑛
< 0.  That is, increasing the number of low demand signals 
required makes it harder to pass verification in both demand states.  It follows that  
 𝜕𝔼𝜋𝑉
𝜕𝑛
> 0  if and only if  (1−𝑢)(𝑣𝐿−𝑒𝐿)
𝑢𝑒𝐿
< 𝜕𝜙𝐻(𝑛,𝑘)𝜕𝑛𝜕𝜙𝐿(𝑛,𝑘)
𝜕𝑛
 
Collecting terms yields the following condition: 𝜕𝔼𝜋𝑉
𝜕𝑛
> 0 if and only if 
(V1) (1−𝑢)(𝑣𝐿−𝑒𝐿)
𝑢𝑒𝐿
< � 𝑟
1−𝑟
�
𝑘−2𝑛
 
Let 𝑛𝑉∗ (𝑘) denote the value of 𝑛 that solves 𝜕𝔼𝜋𝑉𝜕𝑛 = 0 for a given value of 𝑘.  We have 
(V2) 𝑛𝑉∗ (𝑘) = 𝑘2 − ln(1−𝑢)�𝑣𝐿−𝑒𝐿�𝑢𝑒𝐿2 ln� 𝑟
1−𝑟
�
 
Recall that (1−𝑢)(𝑣𝐿−𝑒𝐿)
𝑢𝑒𝐿
> 1 by Condition (3), hence 
(V3) 𝑛𝑉∗ (𝑘) < 𝑘2  
In addition, rearranging (V1) yields that 𝜕𝔼𝜋𝑉
𝜕𝑛
> 0 if and only if 𝑛 < 𝑛𝑉∗ (𝑘).  Therefore, for a 
given value of 𝑘 the firm’s optimal choice of 𝑛 over the interval [0,𝑘] is 𝑛∗(𝑘) if 𝑛𝑉∗ (𝑘) > 0 and 
is 0 otherwise.  If the optimal choice of 𝑛 is 0, the firm will set 𝑘 = 0 and essentially implement 
                                                          
2 For the clarity of presentation, we ignore the discrete nature of 𝑛 when using the first-order-condition approach.  
The solution for the discrete case can be derived following the same logic. 
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price delegation.  Hence it remains to derive the optimal choice of 𝑘 for the case of 𝑛𝑉∗ (𝑘) > 0.  
The firm’s optimization problem becomes 
 Max
𝑘
 𝔼𝜋𝑉 = 𝔼𝜋∗ − 𝑢𝜙𝐻(𝑛𝑉∗ (𝑘),𝑘)𝑒𝐿 − (1 − 𝑢)[1 − 𝜙𝐿(𝑛𝑉∗ (𝑘),𝑘)](𝑣𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿) 
   −(1 − 𝑢)𝑐𝑘 
 s.t. 𝑘 ≥ 0 
In other words, Equation (V2) reduces the firm’s optimal design of the verification mechanism 
to a univariate optimization problem.  Although closed-form solutions are not available, this 
problem can be solved numerically for any parameter values.   
 
The Optimal Value of 𝒌 is More Than Twice as Large as 𝒏 
Inequality (V3) suggests that the optimal value of 𝑘 is more than twice as large as 𝑛.  The reason 
is as follows.  Holding 𝑘 constant, increasing 𝑛 makes it harder to pass verification in both 
demand states.  Specifically, 𝜙𝐻(𝑛,𝑘) and 𝜙𝐿(𝑛,𝑘) decline at a relative rate of 𝑟𝑘−𝑛(1 − 𝑟)𝑛 to 
𝑟𝑛(1 − 𝑟)𝑘−𝑛.  When 𝑛 exceeds 𝑘/2, 𝜙𝐿(𝑛, 𝑘) declines faster than 𝜙𝐻(𝑛,𝑘).  Intuitively, 
finding half of the signals to be low is an unlikely event in the high demand state anyway, hence 
the marginal effect of an even more stringent evidentiary threshold is relatively small.  
Meanwhile, Condition (3) implies that the reduced information rent associated with a lower 
𝜙𝐻(𝑛,𝑘) is not worth the lost business from the low-demand customer associated with a lower 
𝜙𝐿(𝑛,𝑘).  Therefore, the firm will want to keep 𝑛 below 𝑘/2.  Equivalently, for any evidentiary 
threshold 𝑛 the firm will want to search redundantly on purpose (𝑘 > 2𝑛).   
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Suppose the optimal verification mechanism is given by 𝑘∗ > 0 and 𝑛𝑉∗ (𝑘∗) > 0.  The firm’s 
expected profit under this optimal verification mechanism is 
 𝔼𝜋𝑉∗ = 𝔼𝜋∗ − 𝑢𝜙𝐻(𝑛𝑉∗ (𝑘∗),𝑘∗)𝑒𝐿 − (1 − 𝑢)[1 − 𝜙𝐿(𝑛𝑉∗ (𝑘∗),𝑘∗)](𝑣𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿) 
  −(1 − 𝑢)𝑐𝑘∗ 
Note that 𝜙𝐻(𝑛𝑉∗ (𝑘∗),𝑘∗) > 0 and 𝜙𝐿(𝑛𝑉∗ (𝑘∗),𝑘∗) < 1 for any 𝑘∗ > 0, 𝑛𝑉∗ (𝑘∗) > 0 and any 
𝑟 ∈ (1/2, 1).  Therefore, we obtain 
 𝔼𝜋𝑉∗ < 𝐸𝜋∗ − (1 − 𝑢)𝑐𝑘∗ 
This above result, together with Inequality (V3), implies that 
(V4) 𝔼𝜋𝑉∗ < 𝐸𝜋∗ − (1 − 𝑢)𝑐2𝑛𝑉∗ (𝑘∗) 
Now consider the lobbying mechanism 𝐿′, in which the sales rep must collect 𝑛𝑉∗ (𝑘∗) signals of 
low demand to obtain a price discount.  The firm’s expected profit under this lobbying 
mechanism is 
 𝔼𝜋𝐿′ = 𝔼𝜋∗ − 𝑢max[0, 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑔(𝑟)𝑐𝑛𝑉∗ (𝑘∗)] − (1 − 𝑢)𝑐𝑛𝑉∗ (𝑘∗)/𝑟 
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For any 𝑛𝑉∗ (𝑘∗) > 0, there exists an ?̂? ∈ (1/2, 1) such that 𝑒𝐿 = 𝑔(?̂?)𝑐𝑛𝑉∗ (𝑘∗).  Since 𝑔(𝑟) 
increases with 𝑟, for any 𝑟 > ?̂? we have 
 𝔼𝜋𝐿′ = 𝔼𝜋∗ − (1 − 𝑢)𝑐𝑛𝑉∗ (𝑘∗)/𝑟 
But the fact that 𝑟 > 1/2 in turn implies that 
(V5) 𝔼𝜋𝐿′ > 𝐸𝜋∗ − (1 − 𝑢)𝑐2𝑛𝑉∗ (𝑘∗) 
Combining (V4) and (V5) we obtain that 𝔼𝜋𝐿′ >  𝐸𝜋𝑉∗  for any 𝑟 > ?̂?.  However, 𝔼𝜋𝐿′ is by 
definition weakly lower than the firm’s expected profit under the optimal lobbying mechanism 
(𝔼𝜋𝐸∗ ).  Therefore, for any 𝑟 > ?̂? we have 𝔼𝜋𝐸∗ >  𝐸𝜋𝑉∗ .   Q.E.D. 
 
Figure V1: Lobbying Is More Profitable than Verification If Demand Signals Are Accurate 
  
Notes: This figure sets 𝑣𝐻 = 1, 𝑣𝐿 = 0.8, 𝑒𝐻 = 𝑒𝐿 = 0.1, 𝑐 = 0.006, 𝑢 = 0.6, and 𝑟 = 0.85.  𝑛𝑉∗  denotes the 
optimal number of low demand signals required before the firm approves the price discount under verification.  
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Verification Dominates Blanket Search 
In this section we prove that verification generates higher expected profit than blanket search, 
where the firm acquires evidence of demand on its own without conditioning its search 
decision on the sales rep’s claims of demand.   
Acquiring evidence on its own allows the firm to update its posterior belief about demand. 
Recall from Section 2 that the firm has two options based on its posterior belief: it will simply 
abandon the low-demand customer if it believes that demand is sufficiently likely to be high, 
and will implement price delegation otherwise.  
The firm’s posterior belief about demand is determined by the number of high versus low 
demand signals (the sequence by which these signals arrive does not matter).  Therefore, a 
blanket search strategy can be defined as follows without loss of generality: the firm will draw 𝑘 
demand signals, and will implement price delegation if there is sufficient evidence of low 
demand and will abandon the low-demand customer otherwise, where sufficient evidence of 
low demand is defined as “finding at least 𝑛 signals of low demand within 𝑘 draws.”  We will 
show that this blanket search strategy is strictly dominated by the verification mechanism that 
is based on the same values of 𝑛 and 𝑘. 
First note that the firm’s ex ante probability of finding sufficient evidence of low demand in a 
blanket search is 
 𝜙�(𝑛,𝑘) = 𝑢𝜙𝐻(𝑛,𝑘) + (1 − 𝑢)𝜙𝐿(𝑛,𝑘) 
Conditioning on finding sufficient evidence of low demand, the firm’s posterior belief about 
demand is given by Bayes’ rule as follows 
 𝑢1 = 𝑢𝜙𝐻(𝑛,𝑘)𝜙�(𝑛,𝑘)  
Similarly, conditioning on not finding sufficient evidence of low demand, the firm’s posterior 
belief about demand is 
 𝑢2 = 𝑢[1−𝜙𝐻(𝑛,𝑘)]1−𝜙�(𝑛,𝑘)  
Therefore, blanket search (denoted as “𝐵”) generates an expected profit of 
 𝔼𝜋𝐵 = 𝜙�(𝑛,𝑘)[𝑢1(𝑣𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻 − 𝑒𝐿) + (1 − 𝑢1)(𝑣𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿)] + [1 − 𝜙�(𝑛, 𝑘)]𝑢2(𝑣𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻) − 𝑐𝑘 
 =  𝑢𝜙𝐻(𝑛,𝑘)(𝑣𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻 − 𝑒𝐿) + (1 − 𝑢)𝜙𝐿(𝑛,𝑘)(𝑣𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿) 
  +𝑢[1 − 𝜙𝐻(𝑛, 𝑘)](𝑣𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻) − 𝑐𝑘 
 = 𝑢(𝑣𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻) − 𝑢𝜙𝐻(𝑛, 𝑘)𝑒𝐿 + (1 − 𝑢)𝜙𝐿(𝑛,𝑘)(𝑣𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿) − 𝑐𝑘 
 = 𝔼𝜋𝑉 − 𝑢𝑐𝑘 
 < 𝔼𝜋𝑉 
The verification mechanism based on 𝑛 and 𝑘, by definition, is weakly dominated by the 
optimal verification mechanism.  This is true for any blanket search mechanism (any 𝑛 and 𝑘).  
Therefore, verification strictly dominates blanket search.   Q.E.D.  
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When the Firm Can Punish the Sales Rep 
When the firm wants to elicit truthful reporting of demand (through price delegation or 
lobbying), it pays the sales rep an information rent.  Ex post, the sales rep enjoys a positive 
surplus when demand is high and zero surplus when demand is low.  Ex ante, the sales rep 
earns a positive surplus.  If negative wages are allowed, the firm will be able to improve profit 
by reducing the sales rep’s ex ante surplus.  The idea is to make the sales rep earn a negative 
surplus when demand is low, which helps to reduce his information rent when demand is high.  
The firm solves the following optimization problem. 
 max𝑤𝐻,𝑤𝐿,𝑤𝐹,𝑛   𝔼𝜋𝐹 = 𝑢 (𝑣𝐻 − 𝑤𝐻) + (1 − 𝑢)(𝑣𝐿 − 𝑤𝐿) 
s.t. 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛/𝑟 ≥ 𝑤𝐹    (ICL
 𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻 ≥ max[𝑤𝐹,𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛/(1 − 𝑟)]  (IC ) H
 𝑢(𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻) + (1 − 𝑢)(𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛/𝑟) ≥ 0  (IR) ) 
 𝑤𝐻,𝑤𝐿 ,𝑤𝐹 ≥ −𝐹     (Limited Liability) 
 𝑛 ≥ 0 
This optimization problem is interpreted as follows.  The firm should offer to pay the sales rep 
𝑤𝐻 if he sells at the high price 𝑣𝐻, 𝑤𝐿 if he sells at the low price 𝑣𝐿, and 𝑤𝐹 if he fails to sell.  
The firm could further condition the value of 𝑤𝐹 on the price being charged.  However, since 
the sales rep can always charge either price and shirk, it is the higher 𝑤𝐹 that regulates his work 
incentives, which reduces 𝑤𝐹 to a single instrument.  All these commissions should be greater 
than or equal to –𝐹 to satisfy the limited liability constraint.3
Note that the above incentive structure subsumes both price delegation and lobbying.  The firm 
chooses 𝑛 ≥ 0, the number of low demand signals to require before approving the low price, to 
maximize its expected profit 𝔼𝜋𝐹.  If the optimal 𝑛 equals 0, the optimal contract is price 
delegation.  If the optimal 𝑛 is positive, the optimal contract is lobbying. 
 
Following the same reasoning as in the main model, the firm will always induce selling effort 
and will induce the sales rep to ask for a low price only when demand is low.  The sales rep’s ex 
ante expected surplus, anticipating this outcome, must be greater than or equal to 0. 
Suppose demand is low.  By lobbying the sales rep earns an expected surplus of 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛/𝑟 
with selling effort and 𝑤𝐹 − 𝑐𝑛/𝑟 otherwise.  Without lobbying, sale is impossible and the sales 
rep will shirk selling effort to earn 𝑤𝐹.  Therefore, the sales rep’s best deviation payoff is 𝑤𝐹.  
Now suppose demand is high.  By accepting a high price, the sales rep earns an expected 
surplus of 𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻 with selling effort and 𝑤𝐹 otherwise.  By lobbying, the sales rep earns an 
                                                          
3 If 𝐹 ≥ 𝔼𝜋∗, the firm can sell its entire business to the sales rep at the price of 𝔼𝜋∗.  The firm earns the first-best 
expected profit 𝔼𝜋∗, and the sales rep earns a surplus of zero.  We will show that the firm can restore the first-best 
expected profit under the milder condition of 𝐹 ≥ 𝑢𝑒𝐿, where 𝑢𝑒𝐿 < 𝐸𝜋∗ by Condition (3). 
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expected surplus of 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛/(1 − 𝑟) without selling effort.  Therefore, the sales rep’s best 
deviation payoff is max[𝑤𝐹,𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛/(1 − 𝑟)]. 
We solve the optimization problem below.  ICL implies that 𝑤𝐿 ≥ 𝑤𝐹 and ICH
 𝑤𝐹 ≥ −𝐹      (Limited Liability) 
 implies that 
𝑤𝐻 ≥ 𝑤𝐹.  Therefore, the limited liability constraint is reduced to 
There are two possible cases, depending on whether the limited liability constraint is binding. 
Case 1: First suppose the limited liability constraint holds with slack.  It follows that the IR 
constraint must be binding.  Otherwise, the firm can reduce 𝑤𝐻, 𝑤𝐿, and 𝑤𝐹 by the same small 
amount and improve expected profit without violating any constraint.  This firm’s optimization 
problem thus becomes 
 max𝑤𝐻,𝑤𝐿,𝑤𝐹,𝑛   𝔼𝜋𝐹 = 𝔼𝜋∗ −  (1 − 𝑢)𝑐𝑛/𝑟 
s.t. 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛/𝑟 ≥ 𝑤𝐹    (ICL
 𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻 ≥ max[𝑤𝐹,𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛/(1 − 𝑟)]  (IC ) H
 𝑢(𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻) + (1 − 𝑢)(𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛/𝑟) = 0  (IR) ) 
 𝑛 ≥ 0 
The firm should set 𝑛 = 0 and make sure the commissions satisfy the remaining constraints: 
 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 ≥ 𝑤𝐹      (ICL
 𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻 ≥ max(𝑤𝐹,𝑤𝐿)    (IC ) H
 𝑢(𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻) + (1 − 𝑢)(𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿) = 0   (IR) ) 
where max(𝑤𝐹,𝑤𝐿) = 𝑤𝐿 by ICL.  From IR we obtain 𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻 = −(1 − 𝑢)(𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿)/𝑢.  ICH 
hence becomes 𝑤𝐿 ≤ (1 − 𝑢)𝑒𝐿.  ICL and ICH
 𝑒𝐿 + 𝑤𝐹 ≤ 𝑤𝐿 ≤ (1 − 𝑢)𝑒𝐿  are thus jointly rewritten as 
For the above inequalities to hold we need 𝑤𝐹 ≤ −𝑢𝑒𝐿.  This result establishes the following 
cutoff value 
 𝐹� = 𝑢𝑒𝐿 
For the limited liability constraint to hold with slack we need 𝐹 > 𝐹�.  The firm should use price 
delegation (𝑛 = 0) and choose commissions such that 𝑤𝐹 ∈ (−𝐹,−𝐹�], 𝑤𝐿 ∈ [𝑒𝐿 +
𝑤𝐹, (1 − 𝑢)𝑒𝐿] and 𝑤𝐻 = 𝑒𝐻 − (1 − 𝑢)(𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿)/𝑢.  The firm reduces the sales rep’s ex ante 
surplus to zero, and restores the first-best expected profit: 
 𝔼𝜋𝐹∗ = 𝔼𝜋∗ 
Case 2: It remains to analyze the case of 𝐹 ≤ 𝐹�, in which the limited liability constraint is 
binding: 𝑤𝐹 = −𝐹.  The firm’s optimization problem becomes 
 max𝑤𝐻,𝑤𝐿,𝑛   𝔼𝜋𝐹 = 𝑢 (𝑣𝐻 − 𝑤𝐻) + (1 − 𝑢)(𝑣𝐿 − 𝑤𝐿) 
s.t. 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛/𝑟 ≥ −𝐹    (ICL) 
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 𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻 ≥ max[−𝐹,𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛/(1 − 𝑟)]  (ICH
 𝑢(𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻) + (1 − 𝑢)(𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛/𝑟) ≥ 0  (IR) ) 
 𝑛 ≥ 0 
Adding the slack variables 𝑥1, 𝑥2 ≥ 0, we rewrite the IC constraints as 
 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛/𝑟 = −𝐹 + 𝑥1    (ICL
 𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻 = max[−𝐹,𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛/(1 − 𝑟)] + 𝑥2  ) 
  = −𝐹 + max[0, 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑔(𝑟)𝑐𝑛 + 𝑥1] + 𝑥2 (ICH
The firm’s optimization problem becomes 
) 
 max𝑥1,𝑥2,𝑛   𝔼𝜋𝐹 = 𝔼𝜋∗ − 𝑢 (𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻) − (1 − 𝑢)(𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿) 
 = 𝔼𝜋∗ + 𝐹 − 𝑢{max[0, 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑔(𝑟)𝑐𝑛 + 𝑥1] + 𝑥2} − (1 − 𝑢)(𝑐𝑛/𝑟 + 𝑥1) 
s.t. −𝐹 + 𝑢{max[0, 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑔(𝑟)𝑐𝑛 + 𝑥1] + 𝑥2} + (1 − 𝑢)𝑥1 ≥ 0  (IR) 
 𝑛 ≥ 0 
 𝑥1, 𝑥2 ≥ 0 
Note that 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑔(𝑟)𝑐𝑛 + 𝑥1 must be nonnegative in equilibrium, otherwise the firm can 
profitably deviate by reducing 𝑛 slightly.  The firm’s optimization problem thus becomes 
 max𝑥1,𝑥2,𝑛   𝔼𝜋𝐹 = 𝔼𝜋∗ + 𝐹 − 𝑥1 − 𝑢[𝑒𝐿 − 𝑔(𝑟)𝑐𝑛 + 𝑥2] − (1 − 𝑢)𝑐𝑛/𝑟 
s.t. −𝐹 + 𝑥1 + 𝑢[𝑒𝐿 − 𝑔(𝑟)𝑐𝑛 + 𝑥2] ≥ 0   (IR) 
 𝑛 ∈ [0, (𝑒𝐿 + 𝑥1)/(𝑔(𝑟)𝑐)] 
 𝑥1, 𝑥2 ≥ 0 
Rearranging terms yields sign(𝑑𝔼𝜋𝐹/𝑑𝑛) = sign(𝑟 − 1/(1 + 𝑢)).  There are two sub-cases. 
• 𝑟 < 1/(1 + 𝑢):  The firm should again use price delegation (𝑛 = 0).  Meanwhile, the 
firm should set 𝑥1 = 𝑥2 = 0, which means 𝑤𝐿 = 𝑒𝐿 − 𝐹 and 𝑤𝐻 = 𝑒𝐻 + 𝑒𝐿 − 𝐹.  The IR 
constraint holds because 𝐹 ≤ 𝐹�.  The firm earns an expected profit of  
 𝔼𝜋𝐹∗ = 𝔼𝜋∗ + 𝐹 − 𝐹� 
• 𝑟 > 1/(1 + 𝑢):  Ignore the constraint 𝑛 ∈ [0, (𝑒𝐿 + 𝑥1)/(𝑔(𝑟)𝑐)] for now.  The firm 
should increase 𝑛 until IR is binding: 𝑛 = [𝑒𝐿 + 𝑥2 − (𝐹 − 𝑥1)/𝑢]/[𝑔(𝑟)𝑐].  But then 
since 𝔼𝜋𝐹 = 𝔼𝜋∗ − (1 − 𝑢)𝑐𝑛/𝑟 the firm will set 𝑥1 = 𝑥2 = 0.  It follows that 𝑛 = 𝑛𝐹∗  
where 
 𝑛𝐹∗ = 𝑛∗ − 𝐹/[𝑢𝑔(𝑟)𝑐] 
Note that 𝑛𝐹∗ ∈ [0, (𝑒𝐿 + 𝑥1)/(𝑔(𝑟)𝑐)].  Hence 𝑛𝐹∗  is indeed the optimal solution to 𝑛 
when 𝐹 ≤ 𝐹� and 𝑟 > 1/(1 + 𝑢).  The optimal commissions are 𝑤𝐿 = 𝑒𝐿 + 𝑐𝑛𝐹∗ /𝑟 − 𝐹 
and 𝑤𝐻 = 𝑒𝐻 + 𝐹(1 − 𝑢)/𝑢.  The firm earns an expected profit of 
 𝔼𝜋𝐹∗ = 𝔼𝜋∗ − (1 − 𝑢)𝑐𝑛𝐹∗ /𝑟 
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When 𝐹 = 𝐹�, we have 𝑛𝐹∗ = 0 and 𝔼𝜋𝐹∗ = 𝔼𝜋∗. 
For any 𝐹 ∈ (0,𝐹�), we have 𝑛𝐹∗ ∈ (0,𝑛∗), and 𝔼𝜋𝐹∗ ∈ (𝔼𝜋𝐸∗ ,𝔼𝜋∗). 
 
 
Would the Firm Respond to Lobbying Randomly? 
Assume that the firm can commit to responding to lobbying with probability 𝜃 ∈ (0, 1).  The 
firm offers a commission 𝑤𝐻 if the sales rep sells without lobbying, and offers 𝑤𝐿 if the sales rep 
lobbies and sells at the discounted price.  In addition, the firm now has a new contractual 
instrument – if the sales rep lobbies but fails to obtain a price discount, the firm will offer a 
commission 𝑤�𝐻 upon sale, which may differ from the commission 𝑤𝐻.  To lobby, the sales rep 
must provide 𝑛 signals of low demand.  Below we first derive the firm’s optimal choices of the 
commissions and the evidentiary threshold, and then compare the expected profit of the 
resulting lobbying mechanism from that of the main model of Section 3. 
As in the main model, it is easy to show the firm will want to induce lobbying if and only if 
demand is low, and will always want to induce selling effort.  If demand is low, the sales rep 
earns an expected surplus of 𝜃(𝑤𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿) − 𝑐𝑛/𝑟 if he lobbies and exerts selling effort; he earns 
a maximum surplus of 0 otherwise.  To induce the sales rep to lobby and exert selling effort, the 
firm must offer 
 𝑤𝐿 = 𝑒𝐿 + 𝑐𝑛𝑟𝜃 
If demand is high and the sales rep lobbies, with probability 𝜃 he will obtain the price discount 
and earn the commission 𝑤𝐿 without selling effort.  With probability 1 − 𝜃 he will fail to obtain 
the price discount.  In this case, he will earn 𝑤�𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻 if he exerts selling effort and 0 otherwise.  
Therefore, the sales rep earns an expected surplus of 𝜃𝑤𝐿 + (1 − 𝜃) max(𝑤�𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻, 0) −
𝑐𝑛/(1 − 𝑟) if he lobbies.  The sales rep earns 𝑤𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻 if he does not lobby but exerts selling 
effort, and 0 if he neither lobbies nor exerts selling effort.  To induce the sales rep to not lobby 
but to always exert selling effort, the firm must offer4
 𝑤�𝐻 ∈ [0, 𝑒𝐻]  
 𝑤𝐻 = 𝑒𝐻 + max[0,𝜃𝑒𝐿 − 𝑔(𝑟)𝑐𝑛] 
It follows that by responding to lobbying stochastically (denote as “𝑆”) the firm earns an 
expected profit of 
                                                          
4 We derive the optimal value of 𝑤�𝐻 assuming that the firm can commit to its commission offers.  If the firm cannot 
commit, it will want to offer 𝑤�𝐻 = 𝑒𝐻 to induce selling effort in case demand is high.  However, this does not 
change the firm’s optimal choice of 𝑤𝐻  or its expected profit. 
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 𝔼𝜋𝑆 = 𝑢(𝑣𝐻 − 𝑤𝐻) + (1 − 𝑢)𝜃(𝑣𝐿 − 𝑤𝐿) 
 = 𝑢(𝑣𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻) − 𝑢max[0,𝜃𝑒𝐿 − 𝑔(𝑟)𝑐𝑛] + (1 − 𝑢)𝜃 �𝑣𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛𝑟𝜃� 
In equilibrium we must have 𝜃𝑒𝐿 − 𝑔(𝑟)𝑐𝑛 ≥ 0, otherwise the firm can profitably deviate by 
reducing 𝑛 infinitesimally.  Therefore,  
 𝔼𝜋𝑆 = 𝑢(𝑣𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻) − 𝑢[𝜃𝑒𝐿 − 𝑔(𝑟)𝑐𝑛] + (1 − 𝑢)𝜃 �𝑣𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛𝑟𝜃� 
It follows that 
 𝑑𝔼𝜋𝑆
𝑑𝑛
= 𝑢𝑔(𝑟)𝑐 − (1 − 𝑢)𝑐/𝑟 
The firm’s equilibrium choice of 𝑛 is thus in corner solutions.  As in the main model, if 𝑟 < 1
1+𝑢
, 
the firm should use price delegation (𝑛 = 0); if 𝑟 > 1
1+𝑢
, the firm should use lobbying and 
should set its evidentiary threshold to 
 𝑛𝑆∗ = 𝜃𝑒𝐿𝑔(𝑟)𝑐 
By adopting the evidentiary threshold 𝑛𝑆∗ and responding to lobbying stochastically, the 𝑤𝐿 and 
𝑤𝐻 commissions are the same as in the main model: 
 𝑤𝐿 = 𝑒𝐿 + 𝑒𝐿𝑟𝑔(𝑟) 
 𝑤𝐻 = 𝑒𝐻 
The firm’s resulting expected profit is 
 𝔼𝜋𝑆∗ = 𝑢(𝑣𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻) + (1 − 𝑢)𝜃 �𝑣𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿𝑟𝑔(𝑟)� 
Note that the term 𝑣𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 −
𝑒𝐿
𝑟𝑔(𝑟) is positive given Condition (3) and the fact that the firm 
chooses lobbying (𝑟 > 1
1+𝑢
).  Therefore, for any 𝜃 ∈ (0, 1) the firm can always improve its 
expected profit by increasing 𝜃.  In comparison, by always responding to lobbying (as in the 
main model), the firm earns 
 𝔼𝜋𝐸∗ = 𝑢(𝑣𝐻 − 𝑒𝐻) + (1 − 𝑢) �𝑣𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿 − 𝑒𝐿𝑟𝑔(𝑟)� 
which is greater than 𝔼𝜋𝑆∗ for any 𝜃 ∈ (0, 1).  Therefore, we conclude that the firm cannot 
improve its expected profit by responding to lobbying stochastically.  
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General Model 
Proof that 𝑺�𝒗� = 𝟎  
We establish this result by contradiction.  Suppose 𝑆�𝑣� > 0.  It follows that there must exist 
𝑣0 ∈ (𝑣, 𝑣] such that 𝑆(𝑣0) = 0.  This is because the IR constraint must be binding for at least 
one demand state, otherwise the firm can cut the commission for all demand states by the 
same infinitesimal amount, and improve profit without violating any IR or IC constraints.   
Since 𝑆(𝑣0) = 0, we can rewrite the sales rep’s surplus function as 
 𝑆(𝑣) = ∫ 𝑆ʹ(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 = ∫ (−𝜀𝑥ʹ − 𝑙𝑥ʹ )𝑑𝑥𝑣𝑣0𝑣𝑣0  
The firm’s expected profit is  
 𝔼𝜋𝐺 = ∫ {𝑝(𝑣) − 𝑆(𝑣) − 𝜀[𝑝(𝑣),𝑣] − 𝑙(𝑣, 𝑣)} 𝑑𝐹(𝑣)𝑣𝑣  
Integrating by parts, we obtain 
 ∫ 𝑆(𝑣)𝑑𝐹(𝑣) = ∫ ∫ (−𝜀𝑥ʹ − 𝑙𝑥ʹ )𝑑𝑥𝑣𝑣0 𝑑𝐹(𝑣)𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣  
 = ∫ (−𝜀𝑥ʹ − 𝑙𝑥ʹ )𝑑𝑥𝑣𝑣0 𝐹(𝑣)  |𝑣𝑣 − ∫ 𝐹(𝑣)𝑣𝑣 (−𝜀𝑣ʹ − 𝑙𝑣ʹ )𝑑𝑣 
 = ∫ (−𝜀𝑥ʹ − 𝑙𝑥ʹ )𝑑𝑥𝑣𝑣0 − ∫ 𝐹(𝑣)𝑣𝑣 (−𝜀𝑣ʹ − 𝑙𝑣ʹ )𝑑𝑣 
 = ∫ (−𝜀𝑥ʹ − 𝑙𝑥ʹ )𝑑𝑥𝑣𝑣0 − ∫ 𝐹(𝑣)𝑣𝑣 (−𝜀𝑣ʹ − 𝑙𝑣ʹ )𝑑𝑣 
 = ∫ (−𝜀𝑣ʹ − 𝑙𝑣ʹ )[𝕀(𝑣 > 𝑣0) − 𝐹(𝑣)]𝑑𝑣𝑣𝑣  
where 𝕀( ⋅ ) is the indicator function which equals 1 if the argument is true and 0 otherwise. 
Combining terms yields 
 𝔼𝜋𝐺 = ∫ {𝑝(𝑣) − 𝜀[𝑝(𝑣), 𝑣] − 𝑙(𝑣, 𝑣)}𝑑𝐹(𝑣) − ∫ (−𝜀𝑣ʹ − 𝑙𝑣ʹ )[𝕀(𝑣 > 𝑣0) − 𝐹(𝑣)]𝑣𝑣 𝑑𝑣𝑣𝑣  
Let 𝔼𝜋𝐺 = ∫ 𝑧(𝑣)𝑑𝑣𝑣𝑣  where 
 𝑧(𝑣) = {𝑝(𝑣) − 𝜀[𝑝(𝑣),𝑣] − 𝑙(𝑣, 𝑣)}𝑓(𝑣) + (𝜀𝑣ʹ + 𝑙𝑣ʹ )[𝕀(𝑣 > 𝑣0) − 𝐹(𝑣)] 
 = �𝑝(𝑣) − 𝜀[𝑝(𝑣), 𝑣] − 𝑐 𝑛(𝑣)
𝑏(𝑣)� 𝑓(𝑣) + �𝜀𝑣ʹ − 𝑐 𝑛(𝑣)𝑏′(𝑣)𝑏(𝑣)2 � [𝕀(𝑣 > 𝑣0) − 𝐹(𝑣)] 
The firm’s optimization problem amounts to choosing 𝑝(𝑣) and 𝑛(𝑣) to maximize 𝑧(𝑣) for each 
𝑣.  Taking derivative with respect to 𝑛(𝑣) yields 
 𝑑𝑧(𝑣)
𝑑𝑛(𝑣) = −𝑐 1𝑏(𝑣) 𝑓(𝑣) − 𝑐 𝑏′(𝑣)𝑏(𝑣)2 [𝕀(𝑣 > 𝑣0) − 𝐹(𝑣)] 
For all 𝑣 ≤ 𝑣0 this derivative becomes 
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 𝑑𝑧(𝑣)
𝑑𝑛(𝑣) = −𝑐 1𝑏(𝑣) 𝑓(𝑣) + 𝑐 𝑏′(𝑣)𝑏(𝑣)2 𝐹(𝑣) < 0 
Therefore, the firm will set 𝑛(𝑣) = 0 for all 𝑣 ≤ 𝑣0.  This result implies that 𝑙𝑣ʹ = 0 such that 
𝑆 ʹ(𝑣) = −𝜀𝑣ʹ > 0 for all 𝑣 ≤ 𝑣0.  However, we have assumed that 𝑆�𝑣� > 0 and 𝑆(𝑣0) = 0, 
which is a contradiction.   Q.E.D. 
 
Illustration of the Optimal Lobbying Mechanism 
We illustrate the optimal lobbying mechanism for explicit functional forms.  Assume that 
demand 𝑣 is distributed over [0, 1] following the p.d.f. 𝑓(𝑣) = 𝛼𝑣 + 1 − 𝛼
2
, where 𝛼 ∈ (−2, 2).  
A larger 𝛼 means that demand is more likely to be high in the sense of first-order stochastic 
dominance.  Meanwhile, suppose the sales rep finds a low demand signal with probability 
𝑏(𝑣) = −𝛽𝑣 + 1+𝛽
2
 for each draw, where 𝛽 ∈ (0, 1).  Similar to the parameter 𝑟 of the main 
model, a higher 𝛽 means that demand signals are more accurate.  Finally, let the sales rep’s 
cost of selling effort be 𝜀(𝑝, 𝑣) = [max (0, 𝑝 − 𝑣)]3/3.  The sales rep will incur just enough 
effort so that the customer in demand 𝑣 is willing to buy at price 𝑝.  The firm hence has no 
incentive to set 𝑝 below 𝑣.   
From the first-order condition 𝑑𝑦(𝑣)
𝑑𝑝(𝑣) = 0 we derive the optimal price scheme 𝑝∗(𝑣).  The 
second-order condition is satisfied.  It can be shown that 𝑝∗(𝑣) > 𝑣 and increases with 𝑣 for 
any 𝑣 ∈ [0, 1] and 𝛼 ∈ (−2, 2).  Intuitively, the firm charges a higher price in a higher demand 
state.  The analytical expression of 𝑝∗(𝑣) is complex, and we illustrate it with Figure G1.   
Figure G1: Optimal Price in the General Model – An Illustration 
 
Notes: This figure sets 𝛼 = 0.3 and 𝛽 = 0.9. 
 
Next we derive the condition under which the firm should require evidence.  Given the 
functional form assumptions, Condition (7) becomes 𝐽(𝛼,𝛽, 𝑣) ≥ 0 where  𝐽(𝛼,𝛽, 𝑣) =
𝛼{1+𝛽−2𝑣[1+(1−𝑣)𝛽]}−2(1−𝛽)(1−𝑣)(2+𝛼𝑣)[1+(1−2𝑣)𝛽] .  It can be shown that 𝐽𝛼′ > 0 and 𝐽𝛽′ > 0.  In other words, the firm is 
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more prone to require evidence when demand is more likely to be high and when demand 
signals are more accurate, which echoes the findings from the main model.   
Moreover, we show that 𝐽𝑣′ < 0 for any 𝑣 ∈ [0, 1], 𝛼 ∈ (−2, 2) and 𝛽 ∈ (0, 1).  This result 
establishes a cutoff property of the optimal lobbying mechanism: if the firm is indifferent 
whether to require evidence for demand state 𝑣� ∈ (0, 1), then the firm should require 
evidence for all demand states lower than 𝑣� and waive the requirement for all demand states 
higher than 𝑣�.  Such a cutoff demand state 𝑣� does exist when 𝛼 and 𝛽 are sufficiently high.  For 
example, 𝑣� = 0.4 when 𝛼 = 0.3 and 𝛽 = 0.9.  
It remains to derive the optimal evidentiary threshold.  If 𝐽(𝛼,𝛽, 𝑣) < 0, the firm should set 
𝑛∗(𝑣) = 0.  If 𝐽(𝛼,𝛽, 𝑣) ≥ 0, the firm should raise 𝑛(𝑣) until 𝑆(𝑣) = 0, which implies that 
𝑆′(𝑣) = 0 for all 𝑣 ∈ [0, 𝑣�].  Given the functional form assumptions, 𝑆′(𝑣) = [𝑝(𝑣) − 𝑣]2 −
𝑐𝛽𝑛(𝑣)/ �−𝛽𝑣 + 1+𝛽
2
�
2
.  Substituting 𝑝∗(𝑣) into 𝑆′(𝑣) = 0 allows us to derive the optimal 
evidentiary threshold 𝑛∗(𝑣) in closed form for 𝑣 ∈ [0, 𝑣�].   
We present an example of the optimal evidentiary threshold in Figure G2.  The firm will not 
require any evidence if the sales rep is willing to admit that demand is higher than 𝑣�, but will 
require evidence if the sales rep claims that demand is lower than 𝑣�.  In the latter case, the 
lower demand the sales rep wants to claim, the more evidence of low demand he must 
provide.5
Figure G2: Optimal Evidentiary Threshold in the General Model – An Illustration 
   
 
Notes: This figure sets 𝛼 = 0.3, 𝛽 = 0.9 and 𝑐 = 0.02. 
                                                          
5 Note however that the optimal evidentiary threshold does not always decrease with demand.  Its slope depends 
on parameter values and functional form assumptions. 
